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NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY'S ROLE IN CHANGING
PHARMACOTHERAPY RESPONSIBILITIES
Andrew F. Spillane*
Negligence liability has failed to keep up with the changing
divisions of labor between physicians and pharmacists. Based on
factual assumptions regarding the relative competencies and
responsibilities of these health professionals, the courts have shouldered
physicians with the greatest treatment responsibility and have
accordingly relegated pharmacists to the role of pill counters except in
especially serious circumstances. These rules now exist alongside an
emerging health care industry standard in which pharmacists
command greater expertise of drugs than doctors do and in which
doctors have taken on too many duties in light of their own
competencies. Many commentators have advocated for greater
collaboration between physicians and pharmacists in light of these
issues, and such change is coming. To account for these changes and
keep malpractice liability current, the courts should do away with
many of the doctrinal limits on these professionals' tort duties and
instead adopt an overall reasonableness test.
INTRODUCTION
Place yourself in the shoes of a parent, a parent with a teenage
daughter crippled by depression. Her emotional challenges
interfere with her schoolwork and rob her of the ability to enjoy
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would like to thank Professor John J. Kircher, Professor Patricia C. Bradford, and
Dean Michael M. O'Hear for their insightful comments on this Article. I also would
like to extend my sincerest gratitude to all of the faculty and students at Marquette
University for welcoming me into the Marquette community for the last seven
years, an unforgettable seven years at that.
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her daily life.' Worried about your child, you take her to see a
psychiatrist. After diagnosing your daughter as suffering a
Major Depressive Episode, the psychiatrist prescribes Prozac, a
member of the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) class
of antidepressants2 commonly used as the first medication for
adolescent depression patients.3  After beginning this drug
regimen, your daughter's depression continues, unrelentingly.
In response, the psychiatrist additionally prescribes Parnate, a
monoamine oxidase inhibitor (MAOI) "suited for patients who
have failed to respond to the drugs more commonly
administered for depression."4 The psychiatrist writes down a
dosage amount for the Parnate but does not tell you when your
daughter should begin taking it.
Now envision yourself as a licensed pharmacist. When the
parent above tries to obtain the Parnate prescription and a
Prozac refill, you realize that the two drugs should never be
taken together.' According to the Physician's Desk Reference
(PDR) kept at the pharmacy, 6 SSRIs and MAOls can interact to
produce "serious, sometimes fatal, reactions (including
hyperthermia,7 rigidity, myoclonus, autonomic instability' with
1. This narrative is based in part on the DSM-IV's definition of a Major
Depressive Episode's essential features. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 317, 320 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. The "DSM-IV is a
classification of mental disorders that was developed for use in clinical, educational,
and research settings." Id. at xxiii.
2. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 1941 (64th ed. 2010) [hereinafter PDR]. All
references in this Article to the PDR point to the most recent edition, published in
2010, unless otherwise specified.
3. Glen R. Elliott & Susan Smiga, Depression in the Child and Adolescent, 50
PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1093, 1101 (2006) ("At present, an SSRI generally is the
first-line pharmaceutical agent for treating depression in youth.").
4. PDR, supra note 2, at 1584; Michael Van Ameringen et al., Pharmacotherapy
for Social Anxiety Disorder: An Update, 46 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY & RELATED SCI. 53, 55
(2009) ("[D]ue to dietary restrictions[] and risk of serious adverse events associated
with the use of these agents ... [MAOls] are now reserved for those non-responsive
to other drug treatments.").
5. PDR, supra note 2, at 1584.
6. At least one anecdotal account of prescription errors involves pharmacists
consulting this reference. Dennis Miller, Pharmacists' Errors, in DRUG INJURY:
LIABILITY, ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 223, 238 (James T. O'Donnell ed., 2d ed.
2005).
7. Hyperthermia denotes an "extremely high fever," sometimes accompanied
by muscle rigidity in its malignant form. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 926, 928
454 [Vol. 12
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possible rapid fluctuations of vital signs, and mental status
changes that include extreme agitation progressing to delirium
and coma)." 0
As a pharmacist faced with this severe danger, what do you
do? Like many in your profession, you are overwhelmed with
the number of prescriptions that need to be filled, leaving little
time to call doctors and research drug interactions.'
Furthermore, the psychiatrist has ostensibly already exercised
professional judgment in writing the prescription,12 and you lack
the voluminous patient information that the treating physician
had available.' 3  Yet, tapping into your pharmacological14
(28th ed. 2006).
8. Myoclonus is defined as "[o]ne or a series of shocklike contractions of a
group of muscles, of variable regularity, synchrony, and symmetry." Id. at 1272.
9. Autonomic instability occurs when there are irregularities in the
functioning of the autonomic nervous system, which controls the involuntary and
often vital functions of the body. Id. at 186 (defining autonomic as "[r]elating to the
autonomic nervous system"); accord id. at 1924 (listing a number of functions
controlled by the autonomic nervous system).
10. PDR, supra note 2, at 1584. That these drugs can concurrently cause death
is also recognized in medical journals. Elliott & Smiga, supra note 3, at 1102 ("[AJn
MACI potentially can interact with any other class of antidepressant to cause severe
adverse effects that include marked hypertension and death."); Charles M. Beasley,
Jr. et al., Possible Monoamine Oxidase Inhibitor-Serotonin Uptake Inhibitor Interaction:
Fluoxetine Clinical Data and Preclinical Findings, 13 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 312, 316 (1993) ("The seven deaths [reported in the journal
article] occurred when the MACI was added to or started after an established
regimen of fluoxetine [the generic name for Prozac]."); John P. Feighner et al.,
Adverse Consequences of Fluoxetine-MAOI Combination Therapy, 51 J. CLINICAL
PSYCHIATRY 222, 224 (1990) ("Death has been reported after starting
tranylcypromine [the generic name for Parnate] treatment shortly after fluoxetine
treatment was discontinued.").
11. Miller, supra note 6, at 244; Jennifer L. Smith, Comment, Between a Rock and
a Hard Place: The Propriety and Consequence of Pharmacists' Expanding Liability and
Duty to Warn, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 187, 231-32 (2002).
12. A fear of pharmacists "second-guessing" a treating physician's judgment
has already justified court decisions restricting pharmacists' duties to warn. Coyle
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 584 A.2d 1383, 1386 (Pa. 1991); Brian L. Porto,
Annotation, Civil Liability of Pharmacists or Druggists for Failure to Warn of Potential
Drug Interactions in Use of Prescription Drug, 79 A.L.R. 5th 409 (2000). Courts have
also phrased this problem as pharmacists interfering with the physician-patient
relationship. E.g. Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551, 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
That said, one pharmacist stated that physicians tend to be cooperative when he
calls them about possible errors on a prescription. Interviews with Chuck Becker,
licensed pharmacist, Walgreens, in Milwaukee, Wis. (2010).
13. McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1050-51 (Wash. 1989).
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education and experience," you were able to pick out a
potentially fatal error. The psychiatrist may even be aware that
Prozac and Parnate should be staggered at least five weeks
apart;16 she just may have absentmindedly forgotten to note as
much on the prescription. Last but not least, you have the
chance to prevent serious injury to this teenager. Before she
takes these medications, your chance may be the last.17
Perhaps this situation presents easy answers. The serious
risks presented in this scenario clearly outweigh the minor and
transitory impediments to correcting the error. But the courts
analyzing pharmacist negligence" have not uniformly
articulated how pharmacists and physicians should react to, and
prevent, these errors. According to some courts, pharmacists
may not have a duty to warn physicians of errors on
prescriptions,19 their only clear responsibility being to dispense
prescribed medications as ordered by the treating physicians
without questioning the physician's judgment.20 Other courts2 1
14. Pharmacology is defined as "[tlhe science concerned with drugs, their
sources, appearance, chemistry, actions, and uses." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 1473.
15. See discussion infra p. 459-88.
16. PDR, supra note 2, at 1584; DAVID S. TATRO, DRUG INTERACTION FACTS 1508
(2010); ARNOLD W. KARIG & EDWARD A. HARTSHORN, COUNSELING PATIENTS ON
THEIR MEDICATIONS: ONE OF THE PRINCIPLE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE HEALTH CARE
PRACTITIONER 157 (1991).
17. David B. Brushwood, The Challenges of Pharmacogenomics for Pharmacy
Education, Practice, and Regulation, in PHARMACOGENOMICS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND
CLINICAL DIMENSIONS 207, 212 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2003) ("[P]harmacists are the
final professional risk evaluators in a long chain of careful decisions about risk that
precede dispensing of a medication to a patient.").
18. Though the pharmacist liability also can be considered under the rubric of
strict liability, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998),
and breach of warranty, U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (2005), these theories are
beyond the scope of this Article.
19. E.g. Johnson v. Walgreen Co., 675 So. 2d 1036, 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996); Kampe v. Howard Stark Prof'l Pharmacy, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992), overruled by Homer v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999);
Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381, 387-88 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987).
20. 2 FRANK C. WOODSIDE, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 13.03[g][i] (2010); 28
C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics § 108 (2010); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and Controlled
Substances § 247 (2010); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 679-80 (2000) (citing
David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Liability of Pharmacist Who Accurately Fills
Prescription for Harm Resulting to User, 44 A.L.R.5th 393 (1996)).
21. Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Ariz.
456 [Vol. 12
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and commentators 22 have advocated for duties beyond the
minimal clerical functions of pharmacy practice. But most
prevailing legal duties, including the broader ones, outline
specific affirmative acts a pharmacist can perform to avoid
liability, such as accurately filling and dispensing prescriptions 23
and guarding against only known or obvious errors.24
Physicians' pharmacotherapy decisions, on the other hand, are
measured by the general professional and reasonableness
standards, normally without the safe harbors protecting
pharmacist decision-making. 25 As a part of an entire system of
liability, these doctrines have shouldered doctors with the
primary responsibility for medication decisions, 26 with
pharmacists merely following orders.27
Tort law should more holistically examine the
responsibilities of physicians and pharmacists, including when
they collaborate, to prevent erroneous prescriptions from ever
reaching patients. To accomplish this goal, the physician-
pharmacist relationship should be measured by a basic, overall
reasonableness test. This test would avoid the moral hazards
created by this smattering of duties and allow legal doctrines to
keep up with changing patient-care management norms.
Ct. App. 1994); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
22. Smith, supra note 11, at 189; Michele L. Hornish, Just What the Doctor
Ordered-Or Was It?: Missouri Pharmacists' Duty of Care in the 21st Century, 65 Mo. L.
REV. 1075, 1076 (2000); Edward Casmere, Comment, Rx for Liability: Advocating the
Elimination of the Pharmacist's No Duty to Warn Rule, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 425,
459-62 (2000); Lauren Fleischer, Note, From Pill-Counting to Patient Care: Pharmacists'
Standard of Care in Negligence Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 166-67 (1999). The cited
articles and comments focus primarily on the pharmacy side of the liability
equation. This Article seeks to examine physician and pharmacist liability together,
demonstrating why substantive, and substantial, liability reform is necessary to
recalibrate physicians' and pharmacists' duties of care.
23. E.g. Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151, 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
24. E.g. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1129 (Ill. 2002);
McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1063 (Wash. 1989).
25. Some states have adopted practice standards that allow physicians to state
compliance with the standards as a defense to a malpractice suit. DOBBS, supra note
20, at 642-47. However, most states have not adopted these practice standards. Id.
at 646.
26. See McKee, 782 P.2d at 1050-51.
27. See, e.g., Homer v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
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Among today's developments in patient-care management are
pharmacists' high level of clinical expertise, 8 their role as
pharmacological experts supplementing physicians' medical
knowledge, 29 and the pharmacist-physician relationship's
continuing evolution.3 0  Like other reasonableness tests, its
contextual focus ensures that the courts can keep up with the
health care field's shifting divisions of labor among various
professionals."1 With effective advocacy from the parties and the
assistance of competent expert testimony, injured patients and
the courts can scrutinize changing pharmacist-physician
relationship paradigms to ensure the ultimate end for which
physicians and pharmacists alike should strive-the public
health.
Part I will begin with a brief history of how the courts have
treated physician and pharmacist liability for medication errors.
Part II will critique these duties in light of emerging trends in
28. Michael R. Cohen & Judy L. Smetzer, One Organization's Advocacy Effort for
Error Prevention: The Institute for Safe Medication Practices, in THE PATIENT SAFETY
HANDBOOK 645, 657 (Barbara J. Youngberg & Martin J. Hatlie eds., 2004); Gregory J.
Higby, Evolution of Pharmacy, in REMINGTON: THE SCIENCE AND PRACTICE OF
PHARMACY 7, 14-15 (Daniel Limmer et al., eds., 20th ed. 2000) (highlighting changes
from the American Pharmacists' Association's Code of Ethics from 1952, where
deference to physicians was the preferred course, to 1969, where that rule was
revised to suggest that a pharmacist "should render to each patient the full measure
of his ability as an essential health practitioner"); Smith, supra note 11, at 188 (citing
David B. Brushwood, The Professional Capabilities and Legal Responsibilities of
Pharmacists: Should "Can" Imply "Ought"?, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 439, 457-58 (1996)).
29. GEORGE D. POZGAR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION
274 (9th ed. 2004) ("Because of the immense variety and complexity of medications
now available, it is impossible for nurses or doctors to keep up with all of the
information required for safe medication use. The pharmacist has become an
essential resource in modern hospital practice."); Brushwood, supra note 17, at 207.
30. See Randal P. McDonough & William R. Doucette, Dynamics of
Pharmaceutical Care: Developing Collaborative Working Relationships Between
Pharmacists and Physicians, 41 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS'N (2001), available at
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/40 6 72 8 .
31. Valerie DeBenedette, Pharmacy Education: Change is the Only Constant, DRUG
TOPICS (Mar. 19, 2007), http://drugtopics.modernmedicine.com/drugtopics
/Pharmacy+News/Pharmacy-education-Change-is-the-only-constant/
ArticleStandard/Article/detail/411524
The move to a Pharm.D. "is recognition that the dispensing role is not
going to be the only role that we contribute to health care in the long
term," said Marilyn K. Speedie, Ph.D., dean and professor at University of
Minnesota College of Pharmacy and president of AACP. "It is a major
paradigm shift."
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how physicians and pharmacists divide their roles in providing
drug therapy. Part III will propose a duty to exercise reasonable
care to ensure that the doctor determines that a chosen drug
therapy option will not severely harm a patient, providing
justifications based on new paradigms in the pharmacist-
physician relationship and assuring injured patients, judges, and
juries a meaningful role to examine these changes for their
reasonableness.
LIABILITY RULES GOVERNING PHARMACEUTICAL TREATMENT
AND COUNSELING
Many courts begin their health care provider liability analyses
with a concept familiar to students of common law negligence:
the general duty of care.32 The courts' first-level statements of
this duty are many and varied: some refer to pharmacists and
physicians exercising ordinary care;33 others speak of reasonable
care;34 some cases impose a duty to act with the highest degree
of care;35 and other courts hold doctors and pharmacists to a
general professional standard.36
However the courts choose to word these duties, most
jurisdictions hold that whether a health care provider owes
32. 3 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND
LITIGATION § 25:117 (2d ed. 2002).
33. Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1125, 1129-30 (111. 2002);
Taugher v. Ling, 187 N.E. 19, 21 (Ohio 1933); Tremblay v. Kimball, 77 A. 405, 407
(Me. 1910).
34. Downing v. Hyland Pharmacy, 194 P.3d 944, 948 (Utah 2008); Nowatske v.
Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Wis. 1996).
35. Peters v. Johnson, 41 S.E. 190, 191 (W. Va. 1902) (quoting Howes v. Rose, 42
N.E. 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 1895) ("Apothecaries, druggists and all persons engaged in
manufacturing, compounding or vending drugs, poisons, or medicines, are
required to be extraordinarily skillful, and to use the highest degree of care known
to practical men to prevent injury from the use of such articles and compounds.")).
See also Krueger v. Knutson, 111 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Minn. 1961) ("[R]egistered
pharmacists selling drugs must exercise the highest degree of caution...."); Fuhs
v. Barber, 36 P.2d 962, 963 (Kan. 1934) ("[T]he general rule is that [pharmacists] are
required to use great care in the sales made.").
36. Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994); Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 434 (Tenn. 1994)
("Pharmacists have a duty to exercise the standard of care required of the pharmacy
profession in the same or similar communities.").
4592011]
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patients a specific duty in the first place presents a question of
law. 3 7 When giving shape to medical malpractice liability, the
courts tend to hold doctors to a general standard of care,
whether measured against the physician-defendants'
professional community standards or an independent objective
reasonableness analysis.38 By contrast, a solid majority of courts
have imposed doctrinal limits on pharmacists' duties of care. 39
Their boundaries become apparent particularly when patients
sue pharmacists for their failure to warn those patients or their
prescribing physicians about drug effects or to correct errors on
prescriptions. The following sections will examine this
multitude of liability regimes.
PHYSICIANS' DUTIES: LEARNED PROFESSIONALS WITH
PRESCRIPTION PADS
Tort law shoulders physicians with myriad responsibilities.
Though the prevailing standard of care in most jurisdictions was
once consistent with the defendant-physician's medical
community,40 some courts have either explicitly adopted a
different reasonableness standard4' or have allowed objective
reasonableness calculations to creep into the professional
standard.42 Beyond general errors in judgment, physicians can
also face medical malpractice liability if they fail to secure
patients' informed consent.43
37. E.g. Wiegert v. Goldberg, 676 N.W.2d 522, 524 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004); Happel,
766 N.E.2d at 1123.
38. See discussion supra p. 457, n.25.
39. Id.
40. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law
at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 204 (2000) ("[F]ewer than half of the
states clearly endorse a custom-based standard of care. Even in these states, the
custom-based standard of care often is not enforced unless the plaintiff directly
challenges an undisputed custom.").
41. Id. at 174-75 (counting the jurisdictions adopting the reasonableness test).
42. DOBBS, supra note 20, at 633 n.22 (citing Starcher v. Byrne, 687 So. 2d 737,
740 (Miss. 1997)); Peters, supra note 40, at 187-88.
43. Leonard J Nelson III, Informed Consent - Duty to Warn or Inform, in 4
LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 22.04[3][a] (2010) ("A physician
may be held liable under the doctrine of informed consent 'regardless of whether
the injuries were the consequence of negligence or otherwise."') (quoting Housh v.
460 [Vol. 12
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Professional Standards
In many jurisdictions, doctors must conform their conduct
to the standards prevailing in their medical professional
community."4 As such, as long as other doctors within the
relevant geographic area would have acted as the defendant-
physician did, notwithstanding the suboptimal outcomes that
physician's choice of treatment produced,45 that physician would
not have committed malpractice. 46
These general duties apply to doctors' pharmacotherapeutic
decisions.47 The details of duty-breach in each case are generally
left to the fact-finder. That said, a few trends have emerged in
determining what standard of care applies in a given case. A
doctor must weigh different medications' costs and benefits,
such as the potential for adverse effects and the extent of the
patient's illness or condition requiring drug therapy.48
Sometimes, the errors can be facially obvious. For example,
in Rotan v. Greenbaum, a patient's estate sued a physician that
prescribed an antibiotic to treat mumps, a viral infection.49
Fifteen minutes after the patient took the penicillin, the patient
suffered anaphylactic shock and died.50 At trial, the defendant-
physician admitted that prescribing penicillin for mumps only
would not qualify as "good practice" in the District of
Morris, 818 S.W.2d 39, 42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)).
44. DOBBS, supra note 20, at 631-32; see WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 162 (4th ed. 1971) (defining the professional standard to require that
the defendant "have the skill and learning commonly possessed by members of the
profession in good standing").
45. DOBBS, supra note 20, at 633-34.
46. Id. at 633 ("[Tlhe professional standard asks the trier only to determine
whether the defendant's conduct conformed to the medical standard or medical
custom in the relevant community.").
47. In fact, most medical malpractice actions claim negligence arising from
medication errors. JACK SCHRODER, IDENTIFYING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 83 (1990).
A study conducted in 1992 demonstrated that medication errors accounted for fifty
percent of medical malpractice lawsuits. RICHARD M. PATTERSON, HARNEY'S
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 451 (4th ed. 1999).
48. 2 WOODSIDE, supra note 20, § 11.04[2].
49. Rotan v. Greenbaum, 273 F.2d 830, 830-32 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
50. Id. at 831.
2011] 461
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Columbia.5' A fact issue remained whether the physician
prescribed the penicillin solely for the patient's mumps or also
for a throat infection,52 and so the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit remanded the case for a new trial.53
Sometimes, determining which drug is more appropriate
for a particular patient can be subject to disagreement in the
medical community. Despite such differences of opinion,
doctors are entitled to choose one school of thought over
another, and the standard practice within those schools
measures member-physicians' care. 14 In Lowry v. Henry Mayo
Newhall Memorial Hospital, a physician responded to a Code Blue
alert that a patient was suffering from cardiac arrest after an
automobile accident.5 The physician claimed that he responded
immediately to the alert, but his medication of choice, Atropine,
differed from that recommended by the American Heart
Association, Epinephrine.56 The California Court of Appeal
upheld the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the
physician because the physician acted in good faith when he
deviated from the American Heart Association's guidelines.57
Reasonableness Standards
A minority of states require physicians to exercise their
medical skill and judgment in an objectively reasonable manner,
notwithstanding whether the practices and procedures they
choose are accepted in their professional communities."
Wisconsin is one member of this minority. In Nowatske v.
Osterloh, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held,
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 832.
54. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 187 (W. Page Keeton et a]. eds.,
5th ed. 1984).
55. Lowry v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hosp., 185 Cal. App. 3d 188, 191
(1986).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 196.
58. Peters, supra note 40, at 174-75 (noting that twelve states have rejected the
professional standard).
[Vol. 12462
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The standard of care applicable to physicians in this
state can not be conclusively established either by a
reflection of what the majority of practitioners do or by
a sum of the customs which those practitioners follow.
It must instead be established by a determination of
what it is reasonable to expect of a professional given
the state of medical knowledge at the time of the
treatment in issue.5 9
In that case, a patient sued his physician for causing him
permanent blindness.60 The patient sought a physician to treat
his blurred vision.61 After diagnosing him with a detached
retina, the physician performed a common procedure to reattach
it.62 Before, during, and after the procedure, the physician only
checked the patient's intraocular pressure with his finger and
without a tonometer. 63 This failure made up part of the patient's
theory of his negligence suit against this physician.64
Nonetheless, the trial court ruled in the physician's favor. 61
The Wisconsin Supreme Court remanded the case to the
court of appeals with instructions to apply a reasonableness test
in lieu of a professional standard.66 The test has two basic
conceptual components, though it assesses physicians' care
under the same general rubric of reasonable prudence. First, the
court flatly rejected that professional custom could itself be
determinative. 67 Though the court admitted that in many cases,
what is reasonable may be equivalent to what is professionally
accepted, there still is a risk that the medical profession may,
"through its 'laxness or carelessness,' . . . 'establish a local
standard of care that was below that which the law requires."68
59. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996), overruled on other
grounds by Nommensen v. Am. Continental Ins. Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001).
60. Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 268.
61. Id. at 267.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 267-68.
65. Id. at 268
66. Id. at 276-77.
67. Id. at 271-72.
68. Id. at 271 (quoting Shier v. Freedman, 206 N.W.2d 166, 171 (Wis. 1973);
Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431 P.2d 973, 977 (Wash. 1967)).
4632011]
464 MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR [Vol. 12
Instead of allowing doctors to become complacent in their
community's practices, physicians must keep abreast of
developments in medical knowledge and technology. In the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's words,
[aln emphasis on reasonable rather than customary
practices ... [e]nsures that custom will not shelter
physicians who fail to adopt advances in their
respective fields and who consequently fail to conform
to the standard of care which both the profession and
its patients have a right to expect. 69
Wisconsin has applied this rule to cases involving adverse
drug reactions arising from negligently ordered prescriptions.
In Weigert v. Goldberg, a patient sought medical treatment for an
inflammatory/autoimmune disorder whose symptoms
returned.7 0 The physician prescribed Temazepam to relieve her
symptoms," but the drug caused the patient's mental health to
deteriorate. 72 It eventually subjected her to a manic episode,
which drove her to chase her husband's car, remove her
clothing, and cut portions of her body with shards of glass.73
After the patient was admitted to another hospital, a psychiatrist
stated that the Temazepam caused her manic episode, 74 and the
patient subsequently sued her prescribing physician for medical
malpractice.75 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals dismissed the
case as time-barred,76 but the court did recognize that the
physician had a duty to monitor his patient while she was on the
Temazepam regimen.77 This duty, the court notes, is part of the
negligence analysis applied in all cases, 78 with no differences
taking hold solely because the case involved potential medical
69. Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 272.
70. Wiegert v. Goldberg, 676 N.W.2d 522, 523 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 524.
76. Id. at 527.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 524 (citing Paul v. Skemp, 625 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Wis. 2001)).
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malpractice. 79
Prudent-Patient Standard in Informed Consent Cases
A physician may also be liable for malpractice should the
physician fail to adequately warn a patient about the dangers
attendant to the universe of possible pharmacotherapeutic
plans."o
Most jurisdictions analyze this duty to disclose with a
professional standard, incorporating the general professional
standard used in other malpractice cases.81 This approach seeks
to protect the physician's judgment as a professional, such that
only deviations from the community practice will create
liability.82 As a further justification, one court expressed the fear
that moving away from the professional standard would
encourage physicians to disclose every possible risk attending a
treatment or procedure, which would waste valuable time and
even scare a patient away from an objectively reasonable course
of action.8 3
By contrast, a minority of courts apply a prudent-patient
standard, which "sets out a general standard of reasonableness
under which the physician's duty to disclose is determined by
the informational needs of a prudent patient in like
circumstances." 84 One raison d'Otre for this rule parallels the
79. Wiegert, 676 N.W.2d at 524 ("A claim for medical malpractice, like any
claim for negligence, requires four elements . . . .").
80. 1 STEVEN E. PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 3D § 4:1
(2010).
81. Leonard J. Nelson III, Scope of Disclosure, in 4 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 22.05[2] (2010).
The professional standard rule has been adopted ... in a majority of states,
including Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming. The professional standard has
been adopted by statute in other states, including Florida, Idaho,
Kentucky, Maine, and Nebraska.
Id.
82. Id. (quoting Natanson v Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960)).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 22.05[3].
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Wisconsin Supreme Court's justification for a reasonableness
standard in Nowatske: "Respect for the patient's right of self-
determination on particular therapy demands a standard set by
law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may
not impose upon themselves."" Moreover, the California
Supreme Court in Cobbs v. Grant applied the prudent-patient
standard to tether physicians' standard of care to patients'
needs.86
In a case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit applying California's prudent-patient standard,
Hutchinson v. United States, an asthmatic patient filed a medical
malpractice suit against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA)." When the patient visited the United States
Public Health Service Hospital to seek treatment for flu-like
symptoms, a physician diagnosed the patient as suffering an
asthma attack.8 Though the patient's drug regimen started
more conservatively, the physician began prescribing higher
amounts of Prednisone. 89 This drug had the capability to
produce severe side effects, "including aseptic necrosis of the
femoral heads (collapse of the ball and socket hip joint)." 90 The
physician did not mention this possibility, and this severe risk
85. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
86. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972). See also Marjorie Maguire Shultz,
From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE. L.J. 219,
219 (1985) ("Judges and legal scholars have long asserted the importance of patient
autonomy in medical decisionmaking.").
87. Hutchinson v. United States, 915 F.2d 560, 561 (9th Cir. 1990). The FTCA
currently provides:
[T~he district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages[] . . . for injury or loss
of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006). Given the alleged malpractice in Hutchinson took
place in San Francisco, the district court and the Ninth Circuit properly applied
California law in this case.
88. Hutchinson, 915 F.2d at 561.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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became a reality.91 The patient's aseptic necrosis required
numerous surgical operations on his hip, and his condition
threatened him with lifetime confinement to a wheelchair. 92 The
patient countered with an FTCA lawsuit against the United
States. 93 The United States initially received summary judgment
in its favor, with the district court noting that evidence
suggested that physicians typically prescribe Prednisone for
asthma. In effect, the district court premised its decision on the
professional standard, and the Ninth Circuit thought as much
when the patient appealed the court's summary judgment.94
Noting Cobbs v. Grant,95 the Ninth Circuit sent the case back to
the district court to apply California's prudent-patient
standard. 96
On remand, the district court ruled against the patient
again, this time stating that the patient produced insufficient
evidence to show that a reasonably prudent asthmatic patient
would have changed his or her decision to take the drug.97 The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded this judgment as well for
being a clearly erroneous factual finding.98 This error rested on
two grounds. First, the Ninth Circuit believed that the district
court mistakenly assumed that Prednisone's risks had different
probabilities of materializing in asthmatic patients from those
not suffering from asthma.99  Second, the Ninth Circuit
compared Prednisone's risk of adverse events and therapeutic
value with the costs and benefits of the patient's prior
conservative treatment plan, deciding that a patient in the
plaintiff's position would not have consented to taking
Prednisone when the conservative treatment plan could produce
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Hutchinson v. United States, 841 F.2d 966, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1988).
95. Id. at 967 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972)).
96. Hutchinson, 841 F.2d at 967-68.
97. Hutchinson, 915 F.2d at 561.
98. Id. at 563.
99. Id. at 562.
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mostly the same therapeutic effects without the severe risks.o10
Manufacturers' Instructions and Warnings
Whether the courts scrutinize physicians' drug therapy
choices and orders under the professional community,
reasonableness, or prudent-patient rubrics, many also look to
manufacturers' labeling and package inserts as part of their
negligence inquiry. The courts split, however, on the extent of
these instructions' evidentiary impact.10
Some courts have held that deviations from manufacturer
warnings and recommendations are prima facie negligent.102 For
example, in Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., the trustee for the heirs
of a deceased patient sued the physician that prescribed
chloromycetin, the antibiotic that caused the patient's death.03
This patient sought the doctor to treat an ear infection.0 4 The
physician diagnosed the patient's problem as "acute purulent
otitis media" and as such prescribed chloromycetin.05 Though
the patient's condition worsened, the physician continued to
prescribe this medication, ignoring the manufacturer's warning
that anemia could result.06 The accumulation of these
medications ultimately caused the patient to become severely
anemic and develop bone marrow depression.107 These
conditions ultimately caused her death.10 8
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial and
appellate courts' findings that the physician did not act
negligently.109 This disposition resulted from the rule the court
100. Id. at 562-63.
101. David Carl Minneman, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Drug
Manufacturer's Package Insert Recommendations as Evidence of Standard of Care, 82
A.L.R.4th 166, § 2a (2010).
102. Id.
103. Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 181 N.W.2d 882, 884 (Minn. 1970).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 884-85.
107. Id. at 884.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 887.
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pronounced: "[w]here the dosage is prescribed by the
manufacturer, testimony of the physician's failure to adhere to
its recommendation is sufficient evidence to require him to
explain the reason for his deviation.""o Such reasons can be
shown in some cases,' but the Mulder court suggested that
ignoring manufacturers' warnings can at least raise an inference
of negligence.
Other courts accord manufacturers' warnings some
probative value but not controlling weight.112 In a New Jersey
case, Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson, a patient sued her physicians
and an unnamed pharmaceutical manufacturer for wrongful
birth of a child with a limb reduction birth defect.113 The defect
arose from the woman ingesting Provera, a drug that the PDR
warned can cause congenital anomalies in fetuses.114 The case
does not disclose whether its facts established that the
physicians knew about these warnings,115 but both physicians
the woman saw told her not to worry about whether the drugs
would have adverse effects on the children she carried.116 As the
court described the results, the woman's "[p]regnancy was not
without incident."1 7 One child died,"8 and the other twin
suffered from congenital impairment of bilateral limb
reduction."9
When the New Jersey Supreme Court heard this case, the
plaintiffs argued "that the PDR, which contained specific
warnings that Provera could cause bilateral limb reduction, the
retention of a defective ovum, and general genetic anomalies,
constituted evidence of the standard of care governing the
110. Id.
111. 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 32, § 25:17.
112. Minneman, supra note 101, § 2a.
113. Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805, 810 (N.J. 1999).
114. Id. at 809.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 810.
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doctors' duty of disclosure." 12 0 That said, because "PDR
warnings are written 'for many reasons including compliance
with FDA requirements, advertisement, the provision of useful
information to physicians, and an attempt to limit the
manufacturer's liability[,]"" 2 ' the Supreme Court refused to
recognize that the PDR by itself could establish the standard of
care.122
PHARMACISTS' DUTIES: PILL-COUNTERS AND CLINICAL ADVISORS
In assessing the general duty of care owed by pharmacists,
courts often begin by stating that the dangers attending
pharmacy practice should enlighten the applicable standard of
care.123 The most obvious of these dangers lies in pharmacists'
stock in trade: the medications they dispense. Nearly any
pharmaceutical can be dangerous.124 Medical practice manuals
are replete with warnings of drugs being potentially fatal in
themselvesl 25 or taken simultaneously with other medications.126
In fact, some drugs that effectively and safely treat typical
patients may produce idiosyncratic but serious side effects in
others.127 Furthermore, many pharmacists operate on a hectic
and demanding schedule, especially in the retail setting.128 The
120. Id. at 816.
121. Id. (quoting Morlino v. Medical Ctr. of Ocean County, 706 A.2d 721 (N.J.
1998)) (italics added).
122. Id.
123. 3 LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 32, § 25:117.
124. 3 PEGALIS, supra note 80, § 17:2 (citing Robert B. Diasio, Principles of Drug
Therapy, in CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 124, 132 (Lee Goldman & Dennis Ausiello
eds., 22d ed. 2004)); SCHRODER, supra note 47, at 405.
125. For example, a severe overdosage of hydrocodone, one of the active
ingredients in the analgesic Vicodin, can produce "apnea, circulatory collapse,
cardiac arrest, and death ..... PDR, supra note 2, at 561; see also Jason Lazarou et
al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients, 279 JAMA 1200, 1203
(1998) ("Fatal ADRs [short for 'adverse drug reactions'] appear to be between the
fourth and sixth leading cause of death.").
126. Lazarou, supra note 125, at 1203.
127. Brushwood, supra note 17, at 208 ("Pharmacists have, with frustration, long
observed the idiosyncratic effects of usually safe and effective drugs that fail to help
some patients and actually harm other patients."). Sometimes, these reactions
result from unpredictable "toxic or immunologic adverse response[s]." 3 PEGALIS,
supra note 80, § 17:2.
128. Miller, supra note 6, at 245-46.
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fast pace inevitably means that pharmacists and technicians can
and do make mistakes when extra time devoted to each
prescription could cut down on these mistakes. 129 So far as these
baseline duties are concerned, to avoid negligence liability,
pharmacists must act in accordance with the risks posed by the
drugs that they dispense and the surrounding circumstances
attending their day-to-day practice.130
These general rules' simplicity belies, however, the
multitude of doctrinal limits on pharmacist liability. Many
courts have ruled as a matter of law that pharmacists can escape
liability should they perform certain enumerated acts,131
regardless of whether those acts are objectively unreasonable. 13 2
The following subsections discuss representative court cases
creating these seemingly categorical limitations.
Liability for the Pharmacists' Own Mistakes
Putting aside the ongoing debate surrounding how much
pharmacists should counsel patients about their medications
and consult with prescribing physicians about
contraindicationsl 33 and drug interactions,134 pharmacists in the
last 100 years have, at the very least, been responsible for
accurately filling prescriptions.
129. James T. O'Donnell, Pharmacist Malpractice and the Infamous Courtney Case,
in DRUG INJURY: LIABILITY, ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 657, 657 (James T. O'Donnell
ed., 2d ed. 2005); Smith, supra note 11, at 231.
130. David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Liability of Pharmacist Who Accurately Fills
Prescription for Harm Resulting to User, 44 A.L.R.5th 393, 34a (1996).
131. DOBBS, supra note 20, at 679-80; e.g. Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151, 152
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d
381, 383 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Lemire v. Garrard Drugs, 291 N.W.2d 103, 104-05
(Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Troppi v Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971)).
132. See DOBBS, supra note 20, at 679 ("Under this no duty rule, the question of
reasonable care is not adjudicated at all.").
133. A drug is "contraindicated" for someone when the drug will produce an
adverse reaction. See 3 PEGALIS, supra note 80, § 17:9. By contrast, a drug is
"indicated" for a patient when it will safely and effectively induce its intended
therapeutic effects. See id.
134. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 245 (noting "[t]he battle of pharmacy as 'fast
food,' versus 'pharmacy as true profession"').
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In many pharmacist negligence cases, 135 a pharmacist
dispenses a drug different from the one the prescription
orders.136 These errors sometimes arise from two drugs with
completely different purposes bearing similar names.137 A
Mississippi case, French Drug Co. v. Jones, illustrates the
consequences that could result from mistaking the drug
prescribed and another drug kept at the pharmacy. 138 In French
Drug, a patient with circulation problems resulting from
frostbite suffered during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II
sought medical treatment to ameliorate his pain.139 After
extensive testing, the patient was released from the hospital,
with a prescription for Ethatab from his physician in hand to aid
circulation.140  When the patient took the prescription to a
pharmacy, the pharmacist did not dispense the Ethatab listed on
the prescription, instead giving the patient Estratab, a female
hormone drug.141
In the roughly eleven months the patient took the
135. O'Donnell, supra note 129, at 657 (providing a chart from the Pharmacists
Mutual Insurance Claims Study 2000 stating that 49.7% of claims made from 1989 to
1999 resulted from dispensing the wrong drug). In that study and a newer
Pharmacists Mutual study, dispensing the wrong drug occurred in the majority of
claims made against pharmacists, the latter study showing that dispensing the
wrong drug appeared in 50.4% of claims. Id. at 657-58.
136. Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Druggist's Civil Liability for Injuries
Sustained as Result of Negligence in Incorrectly Filling Drug Prescriptions, 3 A.L.R.4th
270, § 2a (1981) (collecting cases).
137. E.g. Burke v. Bean, 363 S.W.2d 366, 366 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962) (involving a
physician prescribing Oxacholin tablets and a pharmacist filling this prescription
with Oxsoralen). In fact, an anti-heartburn medication called Losec had its name
changed to Prilosec, due the former name's confusing similarity to Lasix, which is
"used to treat high blood pressure and swelling associated with congestive heart
failure." Losec Changes its Name - to Prilosec, FDA CONSUMER (Dec. 1990),
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi ml370/is-nlOv24/ai_9246250/.
138. See French Drug Co. v. Jones, 367 So. 2d 431, 432-33 (Miss. 1978). In fact,
substituting a drug called for in a prescription with another not listed could
constitute negligence per se. 2 WOODSIDE, supra note 20, § 13.03[b][1][B][ii] (citing
Trach v. Thrift Drug Inc., 46 Pa. D. & C. 4th 231, 234-35 (2000); Forbes v. Walgreen
Co., 566 N.E.2d 90, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Harris v. Groth, 645 P.2d 1104, 1106
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 663 P.2d 113, 120 (Wash. 1983); French Drug Co., 367 So.
2d at 433).
139. French Drug Co., 367 So. 2d at 432.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 432-33.
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Estratab,142 the patient's circulation problems did not abate, and
the Estratab produced a series of adverse reactions: enlarged
breasts, memory loss, hair loss, psychological problems, physical
and mental fatigue, and nausea.143 All of the patient's effects
waned after he stopped taking the Estratab, except for
impotence, which he had only begun to experience after taking
the drug.144 The Mississippi Supreme Court accordingly held,
citing numerous decisions supporting a higher standard of
care,145 that the pharmacist "did not use the required degree of
care by substituting the female hormone drug for the blood
circulation drug called for in appellee's prescription. 14 6
The second most common pharmacist errorl 47 is dispensing
the correct drug but in a strength or dosage out of sync with that
set forth in the prescription.148 In one case, Cazes v. Raisinger, a
physician prescribed Lanoxin for a patient with heart problems,
with instructions for her to take one tablet each morning.149
Instead, after the patient made a return trip to the emergency
room, the physician found a medicine bottle with instructions
for the patient to take "[o]ne tablet four times a day."150
Further complications arose from then onward. The patient
was hospitalized for congestive heart failure, began seeing a
psychiatrist to treat her fear of taking medications, and was
admitted to the hospital again because of another bout of
congestive heart failure and acute anteroseptal myocardial
142. See id.
143. Id. at 433.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 434 (citing Tombari v. Connors, 82 A. 640 (Conn. 1912); Knoefel v.
Atkins, 81 N.E. 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1907); Fuhs v. Barber, 36 P.2d 962 (Kan. 1934);
Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Edelstein v. Cook, 140 N.E.
765 (Ohio 1923); Hoar v. Rasmusen, 282 N.W. 652 (Wis. 1938)).
146. French Drug Co., 367 So. 2d at 434.
147. O'Donnell, supra note 129, at 657 (showing in the same study cited in
footnote 135 that dispensing the correct drug in the wrong strength to be the
second-most-common error, accounting for 25.1% of all claims).
148. Travers, supra note 136, § 3b.
149. Cazes v. Raisinger, 430 So. 2d 104, 104 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
150. Id. at 104-05.
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infarction.151 The lattermost illness ultimately caused her
death.152 The appellate court thus recognized that "Mrs. Cazes
suffered an adverse reaction that was due to the negligence of
the pharmacist."153
These two types of errors at one time accounted for around
seventy-five percent of all claims against pharmacies, 154 but
pharmacists can make mistakes dispensing pharmaceuticals in
many other ways. Sometimes, pharmacist liability may arise
from placing inadequate warnings on the drugs' labels,'
improperly storing medications,156 compounding drugs in a way
different from that prescribed, 57 and substituting a generic for a
brand name when the generic is less effective."'
No Liability if Prescription Medication Is Accurately Dispensed
Though the courts uniformly hold pharmacists responsible
for failing to fulfill the basic clerical duties attending pharmacy
practice, the courts split in nearly innumerable directions as to
whether pharmacists can be held liable because they filled a
prescription in perfect conformity to the physicians' orders,
however erroneous. Put another way, pharmacist negligence
cases can turn on whether a pharmacist owes a patient the duty
to consult with physicians about prescription errors. To further
complicate matters, the courts are wrestling with the extent to
which OBRA '90 informs or establishes a duty for pharmacists to
review prescriptions and offer pharmacotherapy counseling to
patients.
Some court decisions appear at first to limit pharmacists'
tort duties to the practice's clerical functions. Florida, Georgia,
Michigan, and Texas seem to endorse this position at this time,
151. Id. at 105.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 107.
154. O'Donnell, supra note 129, at 657.
155. Travers, supra note 136, § 7.
156. Id. § 8.
157. Id. § 4.
158. 2 WOODSIDE, supra note 20, § 13.03[2][b][v].
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but they have not directly confronted whether pharmacists must
correct subjectively known or objectively obvious physician
error.'5 9 The Michigan appellate courts, for example, have
explicitly left the question of pharmacist liability for filling
obviously dangerous prescriptions unanswered. In Lemire v.
Garrard Drugs, Inc., the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that,
"as a general rule, . . . druggists are not liable for correctly filling
a prescription."160 A later case, Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs,
involved a plaintiff injured in an automobile accident caused by
a defendant feeling the drowsy effects of Tofranil, an
antidepressant. 16' The plaintiff alleged that neither the
defendant's physician nor his pharmacist warned the defendant
about the drug's side effects.162 As such, the plaintiff sued the
physician, the pharmacist, and the pharmacist's employer.16 3
After the trial court granted summary judgment to all of these
judgments, the plaintiff appealed. 164
The Michigan Court of Appeals refused to recognize a duty
to warn patients of a prescription drug's adverse effects. 165 That
said, the court distinguished cases involving obvious errors on a
prescription's face.166 At the end of the opinion, the court noted
159. Johnson v. Walgreen Co., 675 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996);
Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Chamblin
v. K-Mart Corp., 612 S.E.2d 25, 27-28 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); Walker v. Jack Eckerd
Corp., 434 S.E.2d 63, 69 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151, 153
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Lemire v. Garrard Drugs, 291 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1980); Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 466 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000). The duty to take some kind of corrective action regarding known
contraindications or obvious errors on prescriptions appears to be the prevailing
rule in the courts directly treating such cases. See sources cited and discussed infra
pp. 480-87.
160. Lemire, 291 N.W.2d at 105.
161. Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley Drugs, Inc. 416 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1987).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Stebbins did not squarely address whether the pharmacist had a duty to
warn the physician about the prescription's errors. The opinion thus did not
explicitly foreclose liability under such a duty to warn theory from ever attaching.
166. Id. at 387 (citing Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 123 (N.Y. App. Div.
1982); Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1253-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).
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that it "need not consider a pharmacist's liability in situations
such as where the pharmacist knows of a particular patient's
unique problems or where a pharmacist fills two incompatible
prescriptions."167 In a later case, Adkins v. Mong, the same court
of appeals that decided Stebbins held that pharmacists likewise
have no duty to warn physicians of potential adverse drug
reactions.168 Again, however, the court did not address whether
known or obvious physician error must be corrected if the
dispensing pharmacist is to avoid liability. 69
When the Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Texas courts do
confront fact patterns with known or clear prescription errors,
they will probably expand pharmacist liability beyond
inaccurate dispensation if they follow the current trend. So
much occurred in the New York courts. An appellate division
case from 105 years ago did not find a jury question about
whether a pharmacist is liable for filling an obviously erroneous
prescription. In Laturen v. Bolton Drug Co., a physician
prescribed "Elixir Pinous Comp. cum Heroin."170 "Cum" is a
Latin word for "with,"' 71 so the pharmacist added "1/24 of a
grain of Heroin to the dose, and thereby literally filled the
prescription."172 Because the elixir contained morphine on its
own, the patient alleged that he was poisoned by the overdose.
As such, the injured patient sued the pharmacy that filled the
erroneous prescription claiming that the pharmacists committed
negligence.173 The appellate division recognized that the
prescription was "obviously wrong,"174 but the court refused to
hold that a jury could find the pharmacy liable because there
was little evidence that the excessive amount of morphine would
have caused the patient's poisoning. 7  The New York Court of
167. Stebbins, 416 N.W.2d at 388.
168. Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151, 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
169. See generally id.
170. Laturen v. Bolton Drug Co., 93 N.Y.S. 1035, 1036 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1036-37.
174. Id. at 1038.
175. Id. at 1037.
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Appeals affirmed Laturen in a summary disposition.176
A New York appellate division later recognized that
pharmacists would act negligently if they dispensed a
prescription drug that was contraindicated for someone with the
patient's characteristics. In Hand v. Krakowski, a plaintiff filed a
negligence claim against a pharmacy because the store's
pharmacists dispensed psychotropic medications to an alcoholic
patient. 77 The patient died as a result of "pancreatitis associated
with a severe degree of cirrhosis" caused by the drugs.178 The
appellate division held that the pharmacists "could be found to
[have] constitute[d] a breach of a druggist's duty of ordinary
care in that [they] knowingly ignore[d] the danger and
consequences of ingestion by an alcoholic of prescription drugs
commonly recognized to be contraindicated." 79
Though the appellate division defined contraindication as
"a circumstance under which the drug must never be given" as
an "absolute" rule that "admits of no exceptions,"o80 the court
likewise suggested that expert testimony at trial might
demonstrate that the drugs could have been appropriately
prescribed and dispensed in spite of the decedent's
alcoholism.'8' Therefore, questions of material fact remained to
be resolved. 18 2 As such, the appellate division explicitly
recognized the possibility that the drug store and its pharmacists
are not protected from liability because they followed the
prescription to the letter.
The Missouri courts went a step further than New York's
appellate division did in Hand. The Missouri Supreme Court
overruled outright a decision following Florida's and Michigan's
current law. The precedentially defunct case, Kampe v. Howard
176. Laturen v. Bolton Drug Co., 80 N.E. 1112, 1112 (N.Y. 1907).
177. Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 123.
180. Id. (quoting Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. App. Div.
1979)).
181. Hand, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
182. See id.
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Stark Professional Pharmacy, began when a patient sued a
pharmacy under a negligence theory.183 The pharmacy's
employees accurately filled all of the patient's relevant
prescriptions, 1 4 but the plaintiff claimed that the pharmacists
there should have monitored his medication use and counseled
him accordingly.185 Tracking the Florida and Michigan courts
decisional process, the Kampe court rejected cases expanding
pharmacist liability.18 6 Instead, latching onto Missouri's
pharmacy practice statutes' language,8 7 Kampe held that, "[b]y
properly filling legal prescriptions that contained no apparent
discrepancies on their face, the pharmacy fulfilled its duty to
appellant."88 Kampe remained good law for about seven years.
When 1999 came, a Missouri court of appeals overruled that
case in Horner v. Spalitto.189 In Horner, a physician prescribed
fifty 750-milligram doses of Placidyl - one dose to be taken
every eight hours - and fifty ten-milligram doses of Diazepam
also to be taken one dose every eight hours. 19 0 After consulting a
pharmacy manual, which suggested that the one should only
take Placidyl in one 500- or 750-milligram dose before going to
bed and that the sedative effects would be exacerbated by
adding a central nervous system depressant like Diazepam, the
pharmacist called the doctor's office.191 Though the pharmacist
was concerned, someone at the physician's office gave the okay
to fill the prescription.192  The pharmacist filled the
prescriptions. 193 Less than a week later, the patient died, with
the cause of death being "adverse effects of multiple medications
183. Kampe v. Howard Stark Prof'1 Pharmacy, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 223, 223 (Mo.
App. 1992).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 223-24.
186. Id. at 224-25.
187. Id. at 225-26 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 388.010, 388.010.1, 388.015.2 (Supp.
1991)).
188. Id. at 227.
189. Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
190. Id. at 521.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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(drugs), especially [P]lacidyl (ethchlorvynol), which was near
the toxic range." 194 Though the trial court granted the
pharmacist's motion for summary judgment, relying on Kampe's
duty-to-dispense rule, 195 the court of appeals reversed.
In reaching its reversal, the Horner court subjected Kampe to
withering criticism, suggesting,
[t]o hold as Kampe did would denigrate the expertise
which a pharmacist's education provides concerning
drugs and their therapeutic use. The Kampe holding
also failed to comprehend the role a pharmacist must
play in making the valuable, but highly dangerous,
service of drug therapy as safe and reliable as it can
be.196
In stark contrast to Kampe's view "[rjelegating a pharmacist
to the role of order filler,"19 7 a number of other Missouri and
federal statutes and regulations to which Horner refers obligate
pharmacists to take on greater patient-counseling
responsibilities. 98 Not only are pharmacists trained to spot
potentially errant prescription orders, they may in some cases
have greater knowledge about pharmacotherapy than a
prescribing physician.19  As such, Horner held that pharmacists
must conform their conduct to what "'a reasonably prudent and
careful health care provider would have [done] under similar
circumstances[.]'" 200
194. Id.
195. Id. at 521-22.
196. Id. at 522.
197. Id. at 524.
198. Id. at 522-23 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 388.010.1, 538.205(5), 538.210.1,
538.225.1 (1994); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA '90), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396r-8 (1994); 4 C.S.R. § 220-2.190).
199. Horner, 1 S.W.3d at 524. Such greater expertise on the pharmacists' part is
not a theoretical possibility, as is discussed infra at p. 489-92. For a reported case
involving such disparate knowledge, see Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d
1118, 1121 (Ill. 2002), where a pharmacist testified that another pharmacist would
have known that a drug was contraindicated for a patient but the physician had no
such knowledge at the time he prescribed that medication.
200. Horner, 1 S.W.3d at 523 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.225.1 (1994)).
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Liability for Known Contraindications or Obvious Physician
Error
In the states following Horner's and Hand's lead in
expanding liability beyond mistakes made in counting pills and
accurately dispensing prescription medication, there are
generally two fact patterns that give rise to a duty to warn
prescribing physicians about the risks involved in an erroneous
prescription.
First, some courts have ruled that pharmacists act
negligently when they follow the prescriptions orders despite
subjective knowledge that a drug presents serious
contraindications for persons in the patient's situation. As noted
above, Hand endorsed such liability in New York.201 Illinois also
recognized this rule in Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores.20 2 In that case,
the plaintiff-patient sued her physician and the pharmacy for
prescribing and dispensing a drug contraindicated for her.203
After the patient complained to the physician about her
menstrual cramps, the patient's physician prescribed Toradol to
treat the patient's intense pain. 204 Toradol is contraindicated for
patients with allergies to aspirin, such as the patient in Happel,
but the physician was not aware of that contraindication. 205
Though the facts were in dispute as to which pharmacist filled
the prescription and when, the pharmacist allegedly on duty at
the time the Toradol was dispensed testified that "she was
aware that Toradol was contraindicated for persons who were
sensitive to aspirin and ibuprofen."2 06  In all events, the
201. Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (N. Y. App. Div. 1982). It
appears that in New York, pharmacists do not become liable for filling objectively
obvious but not subjectively known errors and contraindications appearing on a
prescription. See, e.g., Fagan v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 356 F. Supp. 2d 198, 212
(E.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying New York law).
202. Happel, 766 N.E.2d at 1129.
203. Id. at 1120.
204. Id. at 1121.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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pharmacy's computer system would have flashed a "drug
interaction" warning, and Wal-Mart's standard operating
procedure was to halt the dispensation process until the
physician instructed the pharmacist to fill the prescription. 207
Nevertheless, the patient's prescription was dispensed
anyway. When the patient began taking the medication, she
began suffering from "more frequent asthma attacks, as well as
seizures and a worsening of her multiple sclerosis." 208 Though
the trial court granted Wal-Mart summary judgment, the Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that pharmacists have a duty to
warn in these circumstances. 209
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals'
judgment,210 recognizing the danger posed by known
contraindications that pharmacists are in a position to correct if
needed. In analyzing whether to impose a duty to warn patients
and physicians of known contraindications, the court stated
multiple reasons for imposing a duty to warn in these
circumstances. First, it would be reasonably foreseeable that
substantial injury would befall patients taking contraindicated
medications, and the pharmacists had "superior knowledge" of
these potential dangers.211 Second, using this knowledge to
convey to the physician or the patient the possible adverse drug
reactions posed by taking contraindicated medication imposes a
very minimal burden on pharmacists. 212 Third, Wal-Mart and its
pharmacists "need only pass along to the customer or the
physician the information it already possess about the
contraindication for this specific customer."213 Conversely, a
narrow duty to warn of known contraindications would not
require pharmacists "to learn the customer's condition,...
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1122.
209. Id. (citing Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 737 N.E.2d 650, 657 (Ill. Ct. App.
2000)).
210. Happel, 766 N.E.2d at 1130.
211. Id. at 1124.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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render ... medical judgment[s,] or interject itself into the doctor-
patient relationship."2 14
As such, the Illinois Supreme Court set forth the following
rule to govern future pharmacist liability cases:
[A] narrow duty to warn exists where, as in the instant
case, a pharmacy has patient-specific information about
drug allergies, and knows that the drug being
prescribed is contraindicated for the individual patient.
In such instances, a pharmacy has a duty to warn either
the prescribing physician or the patient of the potential
danger.215
As such, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial
court for further proceedings. 216
Beyond known contraindications, a pharmacist may be
legally answerable to the patient if the pharmacist fills a
prescription with patently obvious errors on its face, regardless
of whether the pharmacist subjectively knows about the error.217
Most courts have adopted this rule in some form,2 18 though some
disagreement arises as to whether a pharmacist has a duty to
consult a physician about any obvious error, including
apparently excessive dosages.2 19
Though allowing recovery from pharmacists for acting on
obviously erroneous prescriptions appears to expand liability
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1129.
216. Id. at 1130.
217. DOBBS, supra note 20, at 679. One commentator suggests that pharmacist
liability beyond inaccurate dispensation may be based on a pharmacist's
constructive knowledge regarding drugs' characteristics and attendant risks.
Marchitelli, supra note 20, § 2[a].
218. 2 WOODSIDE, supra note 20, § 13.03[2][f][il; 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and
Controlled Substances § 249 (2004) (citing Murphy v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710
P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985); Nichols v. Central Merchandise, Inc., 817 P.2d 1131 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1991); Gassen v. East Jefferson General Hosp., 628 So. 2d 256 (La. Ct. App.
1993); McKee v. Am. Home Prods., Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Wash. 1989)).
219. Cornpare People's Serv. Drug Stores, Inc. v. Somerville, 158 A. 12, 14 (Md.
Ct. App. 1932) ("Of course this does not mean that pharmacists can safely fill
prescriptions calling for doses that are obviously fatal . . . ."), with Eldridge v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551, 553 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (refusing to impose a duty on a
pharmacist to warn that a prescription calls for excessive dosages because "[tihe
propriety of a prescription depends not only on the propensities of the drug but
also on the patient's condition").
482 [Vol. 12
NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY'S ROLE
when compared to the rules adopted in Florida, Georgia, Texas,
and Michigan, this rule still operates as a limit on pharmacists'
tort duties. On this point, the Washington Supreme Court's
decision in McKee v. American Home Products is instructive. In
that case, a patient took Plegine, an appetite suppressant, on a
regular basis for ten years.220 This medication regimen directly
conflicted with warnings and instructions listed in the 1984
edition of PDR.22 1 That edition of the PDR stated that, because of
the drug's tendency to cause addiction, the drug should be
discontinued after a few weeks of usage.222 The PDR further
showed that the risks wrought by overusing Plegine include
"extreme fatigue and mental depression after abrupt cessation,
intense psychological dependence and severe social dysfunction,
and at an extreme, psychosis." 2 23 Nevertheless, her physician
continued to sign prescriptions and authorize refills, and the two
defendant pharmacists continued to dispense these drugs.224 In
a lawsuit to recover for the physical and psychological harms
brought on by her Plegine regimen, the patient sought recovery
from Plegine's manufacturer, the prescribing physician, and the
dispensing pharmacists. 25
The Washington Supreme Court held that the patient could
not state a negligence claim against the pharmacists, in part
because pharmacists do not owe their patients a duty to warn
220. McKee v. Am. Home Prods., Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1046 (Wash. 1989).
221. In McKee, the first physician began prescribing Plegine in 1974. Id. In the
year before, the PDR included no warning regarding Plegine's dependency
dangers. PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 576 (27th ed. 1973). That said, the PDR's
29th edition, published in 1975, warned that Plegine can subject patients addicted to
it to a laundry list of serious consequences, including "severe social dysfunction"
and, in some cases, "psychosis, often clinically indistinguishable from
schizophrenia." PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 592 (29th ed. 1975). Similarly to the
1984 edition cited in McKee, the 1975 PDR warns that "[tiolerance to the anoretic
effect of PLEGINE develops within a few weeks." Id. at 592. As such, knowledge
existed in the medical field regarding Plegine's dangerously addictive effects while
the McKee plaintiff's first physician continued to prescribe that drug. McKee, 782
P.2d at 1046.
222. McKee, 782 P.2d at 1046.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1047.
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treating physicians that their prescribed medication has caused
the patient dependency.226 The court stated that physicians, not
pharmacists, are in the best position to determine whether one
particular form of pharmacotherapy is more appropriate than
another.2 27 This is so because "only the physician ... can relate
the propensities of the drug to the physical idiosyncrasies of the
patient." 228 The court quoted the Prosser & Keeton hornbook,
which states, "'[i]t is the physician who is in the best position to
decide when to use and how and when to inform his patient
regarding risks and benefits pertaining to drug therapy."' 2 9
Pharmacists, however, lack "the medical education or
knowledge of the medical history of the patient which would
justify a judicial imposition of a duty to intrude into the
physician-patient relationship." 23 0
Though the court recognized that obvious prescription error
could obligate pharmacists to take some corrective action, such
as notifying the physician, the court believed that this patient's
Plegine regimen resulted from the physician's exercise of
professional judgment .23 Recognizing that physicians may have
legitimate reasons for disregarding a manufacturer's
recommendations, the court was reluctant to encourage
pharmacists to doubt a multitude of prescriptions that come
before them and potentially antagonize the physician. 23 2 Thus,
the Washington Supreme Court limited the duty to warn to
obvious errors.2 3 3 Though the court did not elaborate as to how
a physician's prescription error could rise to the level of
obviousness, prescribing a drug for ten years when it can create
dependency within a few weeks was not so obvious an error as
to suggest that the McKee pharmacist acted negligently.2 34
226. Id. at 1055-56.
227. Id. at 1051.
228. Id. at 1050.
229. Id. at 1050-51 (citing PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 54, at 688).
230. McKee, 782 P.2d at 1051.
231. Id. at 1053.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1055-56.
234. See id. at 1055-56.
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When a physician insists that a prescription is correct as
written, the difficulties the courts have found in attempting to
balance physician judgment against guarding patients from
potentially serious physician error are exacerbated. Sometimes,
pharmacist and physician disagreement as to the proper drug
therapy scheme can not only produce acrimony between the
physician and pharmacist, 235 but it might also confuse, agitate,
and even scare236 patients with time-sensitive medication needs.
So much occurred in Hendricks v. Charity Hospital of New Orleans,
where a physician prescribed Dilantin to treat a patient's
epilepsy.237 Though the doctor intended to prescribe only 500
milligrams daily, the prescription included instructions to take
500 milligrams every eight hours.238
When the pharmacist in the case was confronted with the
prescription, she refused to fill the prescription and sent the
patient back to the doctor to discuss the dosage.239 The patient
did not bring the prescription with him to his next meeting with
his physician, so when the physician checked the hospital chart
showing that he prescribed the intended 500-milligram daily
dosage, the physician unwittingly insisted that the prescription
was correct as written.240 The pharmacist then attempted to
reach the physician, but to no avail.241 With the patient growing
impatient and stating that the physician insisted that the
prescription was accurate, the pharmacist filled the prescription
but provided with it a warning to "'consult Physician about
dosage.'" 2 42 After the patient became "seriously ill" from
Dilantin toxicity,24 3 the patient filed negligence claims.244
235. Id. at 1053.
236. See, e.g., id. at 1054 ("[U]nnecessary warnings to the patient could cause
unfounded fear and mistrust of the physician's judgment.").
237. Hendricks v. Charity Hosp. of New Orleans, 519 So. 2d 163, 164 (La. Ct.
App. 1987).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 164-65.
240. Id. at 165.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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The Louisiana Court of Appeal recognized that a
pharmacist has a duty to take steps to protect patients from
excessive dosages,2 45 but the court ultimately deferred to the trial
court's factual determinations to decide the case.2 46 Among
these facts were that the patient needed the medication quickly
to treat his epilepsy, and thus, simply refusing to fill the
prescription would not have proven feasible in these
circumstances. 247 Moreover, the only warning given was the one
affixed to the label, and the court noted that the pharmacist may
have "breached a duty to take some reasonable steps to locate
plaintiff and warn him of the dangerous position he was in." 248
All in all, this case presented, according to the court, a "close fact
call," 2 49 and the Court of Appeal thus upheld the trial court's
decision.25 0
Liability for Any Failure to Conform to Professional Standards
Two recent cases, however, do not impose doctrinal
limitations on pharmacist liability's scope. These cases come
from a Tennessee Court of Appeals in Dooley v. Everett251 and an
Arizona Court of Appeals in Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club
Pharmacy, Inc.2 5 2 Both of these decisions hold that pharmacists
are held to a general duty to act in conformity with the
pharmacy professional community, without any of the doctrinal
limits on pharmacist liability. 253
The Tennessee case, Dooley v. Everett, involved a patient's
suit against a pharmacist alleging that the pharmacist committed
244. Id. at 164.
245. See id. at 165.
246. Id. at 166.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 165.
249. Id. at 166.
250. Id.
251. Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
252. Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994).
253. Gary G. Cacciatore, Pharmacist's Duty to Warn, 51 AM. J HOSP. PHARMACY
2824, 2826 (1994) ("The court in Lasley ... did not limit its holding to the particular
situation present.").
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negligence by not warning him or his prescribing physician
about potentially dangerous drug interactions.254  Here, the
treating physician prescribed both Theophylline and
Erythromycin. 255 The latter drug has a tendency to increase
Theophylline serum levels and thus heighten the risk of
Theophylline toxicity, a condition that inflicts nausea, vomiting,
and seizures. 256  The patient's physician knew about these
potential side effects and prescribed the drugs anyway.257 On
the other hand, the pharmacist that filled the patient's
prescription had no knowledge of this list of potential adverse
drug reactions.258 For the patient, this potential became a reality,
and he suffered cerebral seizures, prompting a negligence suit
against the physician and the pharmacy where the prescription
was filled.259
The trial court granted the pharmacy's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the pharmacist owed the patient no
"duty to warn a customer and/or the customer's physician of the
potential interaction between two different prescription drugs
written by the same physician on two different days and which
are filled as written by the same pharmacist on different
days." 2 60 The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, separating
the question of duty - whether the law shoulders pharmacies
with a duty of care in dispensing drugs - from the standard of
care - whether the pharmacist acted consistently with that legal
duty.261 Using the fact-law dichotomy, the pharmacy owed a
duty to the patient generally. 262 Whether this duty included
warning the physician or patient of the possibility of adverse
drug interactions raised a factual question inappropriate for
254. Dooley, 805 S.W.2d at 382.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 381-82.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 384.
262. Id. at 385.
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summary adjudication. 263 The Arizona Court of Appeals in
Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, Inc. took the same
position as Dooley.264
PREVAILING AND DISPUTED COMPETENCIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
To the extent that these liability rules embody the legal system's
conception of reality, they suggest that the doctor is the ultimate
and final decision-maker regarding how a patient's
pharmacotherapy should be monitored. 265 Conversely, the
pharmacist, especially in jurisdictions limiting their legal duties
to accurate dispensation, is simply an order-filler executing the
professional judgments made by the prescribing physician.2 6
Even when obvious or known contraindications and errors
appear on the face of a prescription, the courts have generally
shouldered pharmacists with a duty to consult the prescribing
physician, refuse to fill the prescription, or simply warn the
patient.267 Otherwise, the pharmacist runs the risk of
antagonizing the physician, questioning the physician's
judgment, and potentially instilling fear in patients regarding
the uncertainty of drug choices and therapy management.26 8
The reality painted by these cases, however, does not reflect
the expertise and experience that pharmacists and physicians
share. Nor does it parallel the calls by health care professionals
and commentators for different pharmacological service
paradigms. To bring the stark differences between current
health care management practices and the state of health care
provider liability law, the following sections cover physicians'
and pharmacists' general capabilities and responsibilities.
263. Id. at 386.
264. Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994) (citing Dooley, 805 S.W.2d 380, 386).
265. See McKee v. American Home Products, Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1050-51
(Wash. 1989).
266. Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
267. See Hendricks v. Charity Hosp. of New Orleans, 519 So. 2d 163, 165 (La. Ct.
App. 1987).
268. McKee, 782 P.2d at 1053-54.
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RELATIVE EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE
Physicians' pharmacological expertise relative to that of
pharmacists' begins with each profession's educational
background. To be sure, "pharmacists focus between five and
seven years of study on medications, while medical students
spend approximately three semesters on pharmaceuticals." 269
Medical students have likewise voiced complaints about
their pharmacology education. For example, one medical
student reported that she believes that she has not received
enough training on specific drugs, and these deficiencies could
in part explain why students at that medical school have
historically done poorly on that portion of the national board
examinations. 270 Furthermore, another student complained that
tutorials in pharmacology, which lasted only three and a half
weeks, are "frustrating in allowing so little time. The lectures
are good, organized, land] competent, but it is all taught so fast
with no time to come back to anything."271 Both of these issues,
the lack of detail and time in pharmacological education, were
corroborated by another student, who expressed, "I did not
always get enough time to know the details, particularly in
biochemistry and pharmacology." 272
The extent of medical school education in pharmacology
has as such drawn substantial criticism. At least one
commentator has suggested that radical improvements in
medical education need to take place such that physicians have a
better understanding of pharmacology and individual drugs.273
269. Hornish, supra note 22, at 1099.
270. ROBERT H. Ross & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, INNOVATORS IN PHYSICIAN
EDUCATION: THE PROCESS AND PATTERN OF REFORM IN NORTH AMERICAN MEDICAL
SCHOOLS 208-09 (1996).
271. Id. at 220.
272. Id. at 194.
273. E.g. F. Sjbqvist, The Past, Present and Future of Clinical Pharmacology, 55 EuR.
J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 553, 555 (1999) ("A major prerequisite for better
prescribing of drugs is to radically change emphasis of the education in
pharmacology in medical schools.... It is urgent to work out pedagogic strategies
leading to a relevant drug education . . . .").
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Those within the medical education community recognize these
deficiencies as well. Even the Harvard Medical School suffers in
this regard, and that school has tried to integrate more
pharmacology into its courses and even at one time offered an
elective pharmacology course. 274 For its part, the John Hopkins
University School of Medicine sought to integrate more
pharmacology into the third-year curriculum through its
"Rational Therapeutics" course, taught by "pharmacology and
clinical faculty working in teams." 27 5
Despite these inroads and calls to cover more pharmacology
in medical schools, medical school education in pharmacology
pales in comparison to the extent to which pharmacy students
cover this subject. In the United States, prospective pharmacists
can now only seek one professional degree in pharmacy: the
Doctor of Pharmacy (PharmD).2 76 These rigorous programs
"concentrate[] on pharmacotherapy and the application of
pharmaceutical care." 2 77 To that end, pharmacy students will
take basic science courses in "pharmacology, medicinal
chemistry, pharmaceutics, [and] biopharmaceutics .. 27
Moreover, in the last forty years, pharmacy practice has begun
to assume more clinical functions, 279 and pharmacy school
curricula have begun to reflect that shift by "including
therapeutics courses and clinical clerkships that enable[]
students to apply these principles to patient care." 2 80
Pharmacy school curricula will likely continue to expand
274. Marc T. Silver, The Student Experience, in NEW PATHWAYS TO MEDICAL
EDUCATION: LEARNING TO LEARN AT HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL 123, 125 (Daniel
C. Tosteson et al. eds., 1994).
275. Catherine D. De Angelis, The Clinical Years, in THE JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE CURRICULUM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 80,
80-81 (Catherine D. De Angelis ed.,1999).
276. Joseph L. Fink III, Scope of Pharmacy, in REMINGTON: THE SCIENCE AND
PRACTICE OF PHARMACY 3, 3 (David B. Troy ed., 21st ed., 2006).
277. Henry Cohen & Antonia Alafris, Antidepressants: Clinical Use and Litigation,
in DRUG INJURY: LIABILITY, ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 379, 387 (James T. O'Donnell
ed., 2d ed. 2005).
278. Fink, supra note 276, at 3.
279. Id. at 4.
280. Jere E. Goyan, Foreword to CLINICAL PHARMACY AND THERAPEUTICS v, v
(Eric T. Herfindal & Joseph L. Hirschman eds., 3d ed. 1984).
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educational opportunities on the clinical side of pharmacy
practice with support from the Accreditation Council for
Pharmacy Education (ACPE) and its recommendations that
pharmacy schools provide more background in drug-
information activities, such as, to name a few, "[ildentifying and
reporting medication errors and adverse drug reactions[;J ...
[plarticipating in therapeutic protocol development[;] ... [and
plerforming prospective and retrospective financial and clinical
outcomes analysis to support formulary recommendations and
therapeutic guideline development." 281
In short, whereas physicians will obtain a general
background in pharmacology amid their courses in anatomy,
physiology, and bioethics and their hands-on clinical experience,
pharmacy students focus their education primarily on
medications and their properties and uses.
Once physicians and pharmacists enter their practices, the
informational chasm created by their educational backgrounds
become even more stark, especially when new drugs enter the
market. Physicians may be familiar with a few medications
being sold when they just began their medical training and
career.282 But with the constant bombardment of new drugs
entering the market, it is nearly impossible for physicians to
keep track of them all. 28 3 By contrast, current pharmacy
education, according to one commentator, aims to graduate
professional learners that can make it their lives' work to
understand the science and clinical therapeutics behind new
medications. Pharmacists are thus expected to become "experts
281. Allison C. Bernknopf et al., Drug Information: From Education to Practice, 29
PHARMACOTHERAPY 331, 333-34 (2009).
282. SCHRODER, supra note 47, at 407.
283. Id. Even if the advertising and promotional material physicians receive
regarding new drugs on the market include warnings requiring Food & Drug
Administration (FDA) approval, there is no guarantee that the drugs themselves are
safe. See discussion infra p. 499. Coupled with all of the other aspects of medical
practice for which physicians are responsible -especially reaching a proper
diagnosis before even considering pharmacotherapy as an option-physicians
cannot possibly devote the same amount of time pharmacists do to understanding
the composition and utility of pharmaceuticals entering the market.
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on the thousands of medications available today, how each
works in the body, and the ways to use each safely." 2 84
PRESCRIPTION PROCEDURE
Despite the disparities in pharmacological education and
expertise between physicians and pharmacists, physicians still
assume the primary role in prescribing medication. Making
matters more difficult for physicians, they are charged with
making a dizzying multitude of professional judgments.
Though drug treatment schemes vary tremendously from
patient to patient,285 they all follow a general pattern. 286 First, in
any case, a patient makes an appointment at a hospital or
doctor's office because he or she perceives that something is
wrong.2 87  The hope, of course, is that the physician can pin
down what that something is. At this point, the physician must
gather as much information and data on the patient as is
justifiable in the circumstances,28 8 factoring in "the goal of the
physician who collects the information[;] ... the amount of time
the physician has to collect the information[;] . . . the cost of data
collection" and so on.289
Physicians' first questions seek the most important reasons
a patient has for consulting the doctor for medical
284. Cohen & Alafaris, supra note 277, at 388.
285. MICHAEL SWASH, HUTCHISON'S CLINICAL METHODS 3 (20th ed. 1995).
286. Robert Lowes, Medical Education Has Become an Assembly Line, MODERN
MEDICINE (Jan. 10, 2000), http://www.modernmedicine.com/modernmedicine
/Young+Doctors%27+Resource+Center%3a+Medical+Career%2fPersonal+Developm
ent+for+Physicians/Medical-education-has-become-an-assembly-
line/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/1 24 08 9 ("Every new patient needs a history,
examination, lab studies, and orders.").
287. James 0. Woolliscroft, The Clinical Approach to the Patient, in KELLEY'S
TEXTBOOK OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 255, 256 (H. David Humes et al. eds., 4th ed.
2000).
288. See Thomas H. Lee, Using Data for Clinical Decisions, in CECIL MEDICINE 40,
40 (Lee Goldman & Dennis Ausiello eds., 23d ed. 2007) ("An additional concern is
the cost of information gathering, including the direct costs of the tests themselves
and the indirect costs that flow from decisions made on the basis of the test
results.").
289. J. Willis Hurst, The Evolution of the Format, in MEDICINE FOR THE
PRACTICING PHYSICIAN 1, 1-2 (J. Willis Hurst ed., 4th ed. 1996).
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intervention. 290 From there, a doctor will attempt to guide the
patient so that he or she can disclose every piece of needed
information about his or her medical history and background,
including basic biographical and demographical information
such as "age, gender, ethnic background, and occupation";
"[o]ther physicians involved in the patient's care"; "[hlistory of
the presenting reason for seeking medical care"; "[p]ast medical
and surgical history"; "[a]llergies and adverse reactions";
"[s]ocial and occupational history"; "[r]isk factors" such as drug
and alcohol use; and "[f]amily history."291 After a patient
communicates this information, the physician may then question
the patient about any changes that the patient has noticed, such
as fluctuations in sensory capacities. 292 If time permits and the
need arises, physicians may be able to consult practice
manuals 29' in order to generate more questions and to pinpoint
where on the patient the physician should perform a physical
examination.294
The vital importance of collecting this information and
doing so accurately and precisely lies in this interview and
examination process's purpose: to reach and articulate a
diagnosis. Outcomes that eliminate or at least ameliorate the
patient's condition inextricably depend on a correct diagnosis of
the underlying condition.295 In fact, a 1973 survey conducted by
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare demonstrated
that more doctors blamed "'[p]oor communication between
doctors and patients"' for medical malpractice lawsuits than any
290. David L. Simel, Approach to the Patient: History and Physical Examination, in
CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 18, 18 (Lee Goldman & Dennis Ausiello eds., 22d ed.
2004).
291. Id at 19.
292. Id. at 20.
293. Some practice manuals and consults are organized for busy physicians that
have little time to conduct in-depth research on a medical issue. See Jeffrey
Schaider et al., Preface to ROSEN & BARKIN'S 5-MINUTE EMERGENCY MEDICINE
CONSULT v, v (Jeffrey Schaider et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) ("The focus [of this consult] is
to provide concise, formatted information that will allow the busy clinician to
respond to challenges in a timely fashion."); Hurst, supra note 289, at 1.
294. Simel, supra note 290, at 18.
295. 3 PEGALIS, supra note 80, § 17:1.
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other individual factor. 296
Information gathered in the initial interview will often
prove sufficient to diagnose the patient's condition correctly. 29 7
Sometimes, however, the patient may state complaints that
suggest that one of multiple medical conditions could be
present. In those cases, physicians may engage in a process
called differential diagnosis, which is "the determination of
which of two or more diseases with similar symptoms is the one
from which the patient is suffering, by a systematic comparison
and contrasting of the clinical findings." 298 Doctors may also
interpret the presence of some characteristics in the examination
or the patient's history to rule out possibilities.2 99
With the probabilities considered, the doctor then
determines that the patient's problem rests in a specific medical
condition. The next step is creating an optimal treatment plan.
This will not necessarily involve pharmaceutical care.300 In fact,
as a general rule, physicians should prescribe the smallest
dosage that can produce the needed therapeutic effects and then
try to wean their patients off of their medication.3 1 However,
when patients can benefit from drug therapy without exposing
themselves to unreasonable risks, pharmaceuticals can be
attractive.
After a physician and patient agree that drug therapy is the
best option, the physician must take into account a myriad of
factors in order to choose the best medication for that patient. A
patient's personal characteristics and the physician's diagnosis
can whittle down the possible treatment plans to the classes of
medications that the doctor may use.302 Intense pain may
296. SCHRODER, supra note 47, at 42.
297. Woolliscroft, supra note 287, at 255.
298. STEDMAN'S, supra note 7, at 531.
299. Id. (defining the process of diagnosis by exclusion).
300. J.K. Aronson, Drug Therapy, in DAVIDSON'S PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
MEDICINE 147, 148 (Christopher Haslett et al. eds., 19th ed. 2002).
301. Id. at 153 ("Generally, start with a dosage at the lower end of the
recommended dosage range.").
302. Id. at 151.
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require analgesics such as Percocet and Vicodin,30 3 and anxiety
and panic disorders are often treated with benzodiazepines like
Xanax or Ativan.
From there, a physician may choose subcategories of a class
of drugs in light of more specific concerns. For example, within
the antibiotic class are penicillins, cephalosporins, tetracyclines,
aminoglycosides, macrolides, and quinolones, each of which
treats specific kinds of microbial diseases. 304 Then, the choices
are whittled down to individual drugs within those categories.
Such choices of subclasses turn on more factors still, including
their overall degree of effectiveness compared to the risk of
adverse drug reactions and interactions, whether the patient's
condition calls for expeditious or long-term therapy, and, of
course the condition's details regarding its source and cause.305
After the physician chooses a drug, the physician must then
determine the proper route of administration, formulation, and
dosage.30 6 Sometimes, minute details regarding administration
can mean the difference between proper therapy and serious
adverse reactions, as demonstrated by the patient's experience in
Wyeth v. Levine.307 That case involved Phenergan, an
antihistamine used to treat nausea.308 This drug could be
administered intravenously (IV).309 A physician deciding to
inject drugs intravenously can opt to use either the "push"
method, whereby the IV forces the drug directly into a vein, or
by the "drip" method, in which the drug is dissolved into a
solution that enters the patient's veins more slowly. 310
Phenergan generally should not be injected with the push
method, because the drug had a tendency to produce gangrene
303. Id. at 152.
304. Id. at 151.
305. Id. at 151-52.
306. Id. at 152-53.
307. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1190-91 (2009).
308. Id. at 1191.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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when in contact with artery blood.311 In Wyeth, after a physician
chose just that route of administration, gangrene developed and
the patient had to have her hand and forearm amputated.3 12 As
such, the proper administration method can be of crucial
importance. More typical concerns revolve around how
efficiently the drug will enter the person's body, with IV
injection being the most efficient. 313
In order to determine the proper dosage, physicians have to
take into account numerous pharmacological factors. These
factors include pharmacokinetics, "the quantitative analysis of
the processes of drug absorption, distribution, and elimination
that determine the time course of drug action," 314 and
pharmacodynamics, "the mechanism of drug action."315 Also
factoring in is drug metabolization and clearance. Such matters
touch upon how to structure dosages in light of the "first-pass"
effect,3 16 in which "a significant portion of the dose may be
metabolically inactivated in either the intestin[es] ... or the liver
before the drug reaches the systemic circulation," 317 and whether
someone suffers from kidney diseases that would stifle the
patient's ability to metabolize the drug, meaning a dosage
administered for someone with adequate kidney functioning
could be toxic for a patient with renal insufficiencies. 318 These
factors address whether and how the chemical molecules meant
to induce therapeutic effects reach the places in a person's body
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Robert B. Diasio, Principles of Drug Therapy, in CECIL MEDICINE 139, 139 (Lee
Goldman & Dennis Ausiello eds., 23d ed. 2007).
314. Arthur J. Atkinson, Jr., Introduction to Clinical Pharmacology, in PRINCIPLES
OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1, 4 (Arthur J. Atkinson, Jr. et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
315. Id. See also lain L. 0. Buxton, Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacodynamics: The
Dynamics of Drug Absorption, Distribution, Action, and Elimination, in GOODMAN AND
GILMAN'S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 1, 1 (Laurence L.
Brunton et al. eds., 11th ed. 2006).
316. Buxton, supra note 315, at 4.
317. Id. at 11.
318. See Atkinson, supra note 314, at 5-6 ("Failure to appreciate that a patient
has impaired renal function is a frequent cause of dose-related adverse drug
reactions with digoxin and other drugs that normally rely primarily on the kidneys
for elimination.").
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where the drug can produce those desired effects. 3 19
After the doctor settles on a treatment plan and writes a
prescription, the patient will typically then take the prescription
to a pharmacist to have it filled. Due to the demanding
schedules in pharmacy practice, especially in the retail setting,
pharmacists may not have the time to assume any more
responsibility than accurate pill-counting.320 Some computer
programs like the one in Happel will flag potentially harmful
drug interactions, but this software might not indicate the scope
and nature of the danger posed by such an interaction.321
Despite their onerous schedules, pharmacists generally will
place calls to the prescribing doctor's office when they are
confronted with a potentially problematic prescription.322 Once
the doctor clarifies or reiterates his or her orders, the pharmacist
may simply fill the prescription and warn the patient about the
possible dangers in the medications.323
CALLS FOR INTERDEPENDENT RELIANCE
Many commentators are pushing for more physician-
pharmacist collaboration. 324 Among the justifications are
relieving physicians of some of their pharmacotherapy decision-
making burden325 and carving out a more meaningful role for
319. One theory on how medications produce these effects is the receptor
theory, in which a drug molecule attaches to the receptor and triggers the receptor
to produce more action (an "agonist") or inhibits its functioning (an "antagonist").
J. Mitchell & P. Seeman, Drug Receptors, in PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL PHARMACOLOGY
91, 91, 95-96 (Harold Kalant & Walter H. E. Roschlau eds., 6th ed. 1998); D.J.
Triggle, Receptor Theory, in RECEPTORS IN PHARMACOLOGY 2, 2 (John R. Smythies &
Ronald J. Bradley eds., 1978).
320. Smith, supra note 11, at 230-31.
321. See Steven A. Scott, The Prescription, in REMINGTON: THE SCIENCE AND
PRACTICE OF PHARMACY 1823, 1827 (David B. Troy et al. eds., 21st ed. 2006).
322. See Interviews with Chuck Becker, supra note 12.
323. Id.
324. E.g. Am. Soc'y of Health Sys. Pharmacists (ASHP), ASHP Guidelines on
Preventing Medication Errors in Hospitals, 50 AM. J. HEALTH-SYSTEMS PHARMACY 305,
305-306 (1993), available at http://www.ashp.org/DocLibrary/BestPractices
/MedMisGdlHosp.aspx.
325. Richard P. Penna, Pharmaceutical Care: Pharmacy's Mission for the 1990s, 47
AM. J. HosP. PHARMACY 543, 546 (1990) ("Pharmaceutical care must be rendered in
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pharmacists as clinical drug experts.32 6
As this Article's preceding sections demonstrate, doctors
must exercise judgment with regard to a daunting battery of
issues. At any point, the physician may slip up and act on
mistaken beliefs of fact, whether in terms of the patient's
characteristics or the science behind various drug therapy plans.
They can and do make determinations based on mental
shortcuts, such as the representativeness heuristic, where a
physician probes a patient to find symptoms that confirm
whether the patient falls within a representative sample of
people to which the physician assigned the patient,327 or the
availability heuristic, where a physician makes determinations
based on the most readily available knowledge on the
physician's mind.3 28
The subconscious use of mental shortcuts pervades drug
therapy choices as well. To contend with the time-sensitive
demands endured by busy schedules, physicians without time
to research drugs newly entering the market may resort to
relying on pharmaceutical companies' advertisements. 329
Though warnings about drug effects and interactions must be
approved by the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) before the
drug can be marketed, subsequent clinical trials and studies can
conflict with the recommendations the manufacturers and the
FDA issue regarding a drugs' usage. For example, one
psychiatrist noted to this paper's author that prescriptions for
medications calling for dosages above these recommended
cooperation with physicians, nurses, dentists, optometrists, podiatrists-all those
who treat illnesses and prescribe or administer drugs. We know from experience
with clinical pharmacy services in hospitals that the pharmacist-physician team
makes better drug therapy decisions than does either professional functioning
alone.").
326. See, e.g., Cohen & Smetzer, supra note 28, at 657 ("Although pharmacists
have long focused on the distribution aspects of their profession, today's
pharmacists must turn to a broader and more clinical role to prevent errors
effectively.").
327. Daniel B. Mark, Decision-Making in Clinical Medicine, in HARRISON'S
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 8, 9 (Eugene Braunwald et al. eds., 15th ed.
2001).
328. Id.
329. SCHRODER, supra note 47, at 406.
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ranges may be appropriate once clinical studies show that
therapeutic effects can be gained from the additional dosage
without undue adverse reactions.330 But sometimes, an excessive
dosage might produce adverse reactions and even drug toxicity.
The FDA too will err in approving a drug and issuing
recommendations. Though some review is in many respects
preferable to no pre-marketing approval, the FDA's mandated
studies and trials bring their own shortcomings. As one
professor of preventive medicine suggests, "[t]he randomized
trials generally lack the power to detect adverse effects that are
infrequent, have a long latency, or affect only certain types of
patients." 331 And so, FDA approval does not guarantee safe and
effective treatment.
All things considered, the dangers and uncertainty in
prescribing medication are manifold and severe. The number
and complexity of the judgments physicians make against this
background can be overwhelming if physicians must deal with
them without outside assistance.332 If a pharmacist does not step
in to correct the error or at least consult the physician about a
potential error, then his or her patients are put in danger.333
Also motivating calls for collaboration is often a
fundamental question about the pharmacy profession's role:
Should pharmacists simply execute doctors' orders or should
they assume greater responsibilities in making professional
judgments about patient care?3 34 In the mid-twentieth century,
pharmacy practice was largely restricted to order-filling. For its
part, the American Pharmacists Association's (APhA) code of
330. Interview with Jennifer Derenne, M.D., Consulting Psychiatrist, Marquette
University Counseling Center, in Milwaukee, Wis. (Oct. 4, 2010).
331. Wayne A. Ray, Population-Based Studies of Adverse Drug Reactions, 349 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1592, 1592 (2003).
332. Charles D. Hepler & Linda M. Strand, Opportunities and Responsibilities in
Pharmaceutical Care, 47 AM. J. HosP. PHARMACY 533, 541 (1990) ("Drug therapy has
become so complex that one professional should no longer be expected to control
the entire process alone."); Penna, supra note 325, at 546.
333. See Michael R. Cohen, Preventing Medication Errors Related to Prescribing, in
MEDICATION ERRORS 8.1, 8.20 (Michael R. Cohen ed., 1999).
334. Miller, supra note 6, at 245.
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ethics in 1952 "prohibited the pharmacist from discussing
'therapeutic effects or composition of a prescription with a
patient."' 3 5 Later into the twentieth century, a movement arose
to carve out more meaningful roles for pharmacists beyond their
pill-counting status.3 36 Some segments of the pharmacy and
other health care professions resist this change,337 the former
including chain-store pharmacists that feel they cannot take on
any more responsibilities in their overburdened schedules338 and
the latter fearing "that pharmacists are attempting to encroach
on their territories."3 39 However, amid broader clinical
education at the pharmacy school level and OBRA '90's mandate
that pharmacists conduct drug reviews and offer counseling,340
the pharmacy profession is currently trending toward more
decision-making regarding appropriate drug therapy schemes.
Notwithstanding the good intentions to expand
pharmacists' knowledge bases and responsibilities,
implementing these goals has not been without obstacles. Some
commentators have voiced concern that "[p]harmacists and
pharmacy managers have attempted to develop and implement
335. Hepler & Strand, supra note 332, at 534.
336. Id.
337. In a 2007 study, 98% of pharmacists responded that they believe state
regulations should allow multidisciplinary collaboration in long-term care facilities.
By contrast, 71% of medical directors opposed allowing such collaboration in that
same study. Mark Holthaus, Long-Term Care: A Test Bed for Coming Health Care
Reform, GERIATRICS (July 1, 2009), http://geriatrics.modernmedicine.com/reform.
338. DeBenedette, supra note 31, at 40; Smith, supra note 11, at 230-31; Hepler &
Strand, supra note 332, at 534.
339. Penna, supra note 325, at 546. In fact, the American Medical Association
(AMA) recently published a paper that "contained references to limitations in
pharmacists' education and capabilities, and warnings about doctors' participation
in collaborative drug therapy management (CDTM) agreements with pharmacists."
Thomas E. Menighan, Pharmacy Response to the "AMA Scope of Practice Data Series:
Pharmacists," DRUG ToPics (June 15, 2010), http://drugtopics.modernmedicine.com/
drugtopics/Associations/Pharmacy-response-to-the-AMA-Scope-of-Practice-
Dat/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/673895; see also Reid Paul, R.Ph.s' Prescribing
Impact to Reach $145 Billion by 2012, DRUG TOPICS (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://www.modernmedicine.com/modemmedicine/Hospital%/2fHealth-
System+Pharmacy/RPhs-prescribing-impact-to-reach-145-billion-by-
20/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/477615 ("Not surprisingly, the biggest factors
inhibiting the move toward pharmacist prescribing are concerns from physicians.
Some doctors worry that pharmacists are not sufficiently trained for diagnosis.").
340. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g) (2006).
NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY'S ROLE
clinical pharmacy services by using models of pharmacy practice
that lack a clear philosophy and a definition of clinical work."341
As a symptom of this lack of direction, the idea of clinical
pharmacy and collaborative pharmaceutical care has been
implemented in a piece-meal fashion. In Canada, one survey
showed that as few as "one in four (25%) pharmacists strongly
agree that they regularly collaborate with physicians and other
healthcare professionals."342
But amid the clinical pharmacy concept's slow adoption,
physicians have started looking to pharmacists to supplement
their knowledge of pharmacology.34' For example, pharmacists
and physicians have begun joint efforts to manage blood
pressure in patients.344 Granted, the floor of pharmacists'
professional responsibilities is accurately dispensing
prescriptions.345 But, at the same time, "[p]harmacists are rightly
obligated to promote a good relationship with the physicians
with whom they work . . .. "346 Though some physicians argue
that they resent being questioned by pharmacists regarding
prescription errors,34 7 one pharmacist related to the author of
this paper that physicians are generally cooperative when he
calls them about medication errors. 48 Likewise, many
commentators express the hope that greater pharmacist-
341. Linda M. Strand et al., Integrated Patient-Specific Model of Pharmacy Practice,
47 AM. J. HosP. PHARMACY 550, 554 (1990).
342. Brett Ruffell, Mapping Out This Year's Pharmacy Trends, 26 PHARMACY
PRAC., Sept. 2010, at 28, 29.
343. Pozgar, supra note 29, at 274; Miller, supra note 6, at 238 (relating a story
where a physician that prescribed Compazine in five times the recommended
dosage asked a pharmacist what the recommended dosage of Compazine should be
for a child).
344. M.D.-Pharmacist Collaboration Helps Hypertensive Patients, Pharmacist Role in
Smoking Cessation Less Straightforward, MODERN MEDICINE (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.modernmedicine.com/modernmedicine/Modem+Medicine+Now/MD-
Pharmacist-Collaboration-Helps-Hypertensive-Pat/ArticleNewsFeed/Article
/detail/690877.
345. DAVID A. GETTMAN & DEAN ARNESON, PHARMACOETHICS: A PROBLEM-
BASED APPROACH 58 (2003).
346. Id.
347. E.g. Hendricks v. Charity Hosp. of New Orleans, 519 So. 2d 163, 165 (La.
Ct. App. 1987).
348. Interviews with Chuck Becker, supra note 12.
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physician collaboration will prevail in the future.
TOWARD CONTEXTUAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PHARMACIST-
PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIPS
The only parallel between the state of the health care
professions' divisions of labor and the liability rules governing
them is that they are in a state of flux. 34 9 On the legal side, the
courts are slowly moving away from the traditional rules
holding physicians to a pure professional standard and
pharmacists to a strictly cabined set of negligence rules treating
them as mere order-fillers.3"0 Nevertheless, with these rightful
strides come a majority of courts that still restrict pharmacists'
legal duties without similar limitations for the benefit of
physicians.351 On the health care side, the aspirations of clinical
pharmacy and pharmacist-physician collaboration are becoming
a reality,352 but a sizable group of health care practitioners are
resisting these changes, whether as a matter of defending their
professional territories 35 3 or refusing to take on more
responsibilities on top of already onerous workloads. 354
THE CURRENT LIABILITY RULES' SHORTCOMINGS
The law has been slow to catch up to the changes described
in Part II. The courts still apply rules based on a health care
context that has long since passed. The rules themselves draw
unmalleable bright lines, meaning that ostensibly unreasonable
or even unprofessional conduct will persist undeterred 355 and
the injury resulting from that conduct uncompensated. 356 To
349. See DeBenedette, supra note 31, at 38, 40.
350. E.g. Homer v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
351. See discussion supra Part I.
352. Supra note 344; McDonough & Doucette, supra note 30.
353. Penna, supra note 325, at 546.
354. Smith, supra note 11, at 230-31.
355. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 39 (1972)
(suggesting that if compliance with industry custom operated as a defense to a
negligence action, potential injurers would not be induced to change their behavior
even if the benefits of safer conduct outweighed their costs).
356. See Valerie Witmer, A Patient Perspective: Focusing on Compensating Harm, 13
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plug these holes in tort liability as well as relieve legal
responsibility when those duties place greater burdens than can
be reasonably met, the courts should do away with the
antiquated limits on liability discussed above.
The Physician Professional Standard's Unreasonable Expectations
Under the professional standard, the scope of physician
liability risks being both over- and under-inclusive. As noted
above, the professional standard draws from the medical
practices accepted within a physician's relevant community.
Whatever amounts to due care in the circumstances ebbs and
flows with each community's practices, including when a
community's standards take on too little or too much
responsibility.
That certain conduct may create liability, regardless of its
own objective reasonableness, 357 becomes most apparent when
facing the courts' treatment of pharmaceutical manufacturers'
instructions and warnings. Recall that some jurisdictions use
these companies' statements to mold physicians' standard of
care.35 8 Under this rule, if a physician's treatment plan deviates
from a pharmaceutical company's recommendations, then the
physician's actions are prima facie negligent.359 Against these
background liability rules, physicians prescribe drugs outside of
the manufacturers' recommended dosage ranges or in spite of
noted contraindications at their own peril.
But sometimes venturing outside of the warnings, warnings
necessitating FDA approval and generated through a
ANNALS HEALTH L. 589, 597 (2004) (charging that legislatively imposed non-
economic damage caps would prevent plaintiffs from obtaining full compensation).
No liability for unreasonable conduct would rebuke the compensation principle all
the more.
357. Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND.
L.J. 528, 528 (1976) ("[IJt is medical custom, rather than standards of reasonableness
determined by judges and juries, against which the conduct of a physician is
measured.").
358. Minneman, supra note 101, § 2a.
359. Id.
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manufacturers' own series of clinical trials, can amount to good
medical practice. Future clinical studies may find that
prescribing higher dosages might induce greater therapeutic
effects with minimal risks.360 Dosages might have to be further
adjusted to account for an individual patient's idiosyncratic
metabolic systems, such as impaired kidney functioning.361 As
to contraindications, some of which arise out of possible adverse
drug interactions, it may be reasonable to expose a patient to
such a risk.362
Yet, the courts using manufacturers' instructions and
warnings to raise an inference of negligence would penalize
these practices with tort liability should a risk that a therapeutic
benefit outweighed materialize. Allowing some leeway for
physicians, these courts generally suggest that this inference can
be overcome. But such leeway may not mean much to a
physician trying to avoid liability. Instead, physicians acting in
an otherwise objectively reasonable fashion would effectively
have to gamble that a court and a jury would understand his or
her reasoning behind such a deviation. That risk of liability may
be enough to deter the physician from taking action for which
the current state of medical science would advise.
Furthermore, a professional standard might mean that a
doctor may exercise a judgment or prescribe a medication that is
on balance unreasonable in the circumstances and still escape
liability. Some commentators "express concern that the
profession is in a position to retain sub-optimally low levels of
care, essentially insulating itself from external scrutiny and
accountability." 36 3 This fear motivated the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Nowatske, which rejected the professional standard as
allowing established practices that entrench "laxness or
360. Interview with Jennifer Derenne, supra note 330.
361. Atkinson, supra note 314, at 5-6.
362. 3 PEGALIS, supra note 80, § 17:9 ("If an 'indication' and relative
'contraindication' exist at the same time, then truly a judgmental risk-vs-benefit
evaluation must be employed by the physician.").
363. James F. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing in
Assuring Quality, Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the
Health Care Marketplace?, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 125, 131 (2002).
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carelessness." 364 In the famous T.J. Hooper case, Judge Learned
Hand echoed these concerns, suggesting that "a whole calling
may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available
devices." 365 As Nowatske rightfully recognized, in many-perhaps
most-cases treating malpractice claims, objective reasonableness
standards and community practice will require the same level of
care.36 6 However, the general tendency for these standards to
parallel each other does not detract from the continued presence
of exceptions.
Beyond the prospect of a medical profession's conspiracy in
setting lower standards and refusing to testify against its own
members, further problems of proof arise from the use of custom
to determine the standard of care. Where the standards are in
flux, a court cannot define community practice and thus, cannot
define the standard of care, with any degree of precision and
consistency. 6 7 Granted, the danger of inconsistent and even
irreconcilable standards presents itself in the general run-of-the-
mill negligence case where custom does not itself determine the
standard of care. 368 But, at least the reasonableness analysis
examines objectively and normatively cost- and benefit-justified
alternative courses of conduct. The professional standard, by
contrast, requires that a court police a potentially non-existent
custom.
Finally, the professional standard may impliedly endorse
the traditional practice of shouldering physicians with all of the
decisions necessary to determine what medications are most
appropriate for a particular patient. As noted above, physicians
cannot be expected to keep up with every new drug that enters
364. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 271 (Wis. 1996) (citing Shier v.
Freedman, 206 N.W.2d 166, 171 (Wis. 1973) (quoting Pederson v. Dumouchel, 431
P.2d 973, 977 (Wash. 1967))).
365. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932).
366. Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 272.
367. James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the
Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
1382, 1391 (1994).
368. Joseph H. King, Jr., In Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession:
The "Accepted Practice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213, 1218 (1975).
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the market year to year.3 69 Thus, to the extent that accepted
medical practice is to have physicians commandeer prescription
decisions without outside input, sometimes based on physicians
protecting their own professional territories from encroachment
by other health care practitioners,3 70 the courts applying a
professional standard are left reinforcing what could amount to
an unreasonable custom motivated by merely provincial
concerns.
The Pharmacist Duties' Moral Hazards
The same issues plaguing the professional standard as
applied to doctors present themselves when assessing
pharmacist responsibility. That said, a wholesale professional
standard has only taken hold in Arizona and Tennessee,
whereas the majority of jurisdictions apply a rule limiting
pharmacists' responsibilities to narrow affirmative duties.
These cabined duties effectively operate as safe harbors.
Generally, safe harbors provide that if certain named actors
conform their conduct to those rules' strictures, then they will
avoid liability. For example, under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, an Internet service provider (ISP) can shield itself
from infringement liability if it promptly removes copyright-
infringing material specified in a takedown notice. 371 Likewise,
in the four jurisdictions that at this time appear to require only
that a pharmacist dispense medications to the prescription's
letter, a pharmacist cannot be held answerable to a patient
injured by an adverse drug reaction, side effects, or drug
interactions.3 72
Of all of the rules governing pharmacist negligence, this
accurate dispensation rule is the worst offender. As Horner
noted, the rule relegates pharmacists to the menial role of order
369. POZGAR, supra note 29, at 274.
370. Penna, supra note 325, at 546.
371. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
372. See cases cited supra note 159.
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filler.3 73 Beyond labels on an entire highly educated profession,
the rule also creates moral hazards. In the first instance, a
pharmacist need not warn a physician at all about an error on a
prescription, no matter how little the cost or inconvenience to
the pharmacist to avert however serious the danger lurking in
the medications may be. In effect, the limits on tort duties
separate the pharmacist from the consequences of their own
actions in filling potentially dangerous prescriptions. Given the
dangers attending pharmacy practice, such moral hazards
should not be tolerated.
Even the courts that have extended pharmacist negligence
liability beyond mistakes in dispensation run into these same
issues with regard to known or obvious errors. The jurisdictions
requiring corrective action when confronted with a prescription
implicating known contraindications do so with terminology out
of sync with health care practice. To these courts,
"contraindication" means that the drug should never be given to
a patient with certain characteristics. 374 In practice, a physician
may determine that a contraindicated drug's risks are
outweighed by the therapeutic necessities of a patient's
multiplicity of conditions.375 More fundamentally, under the
known contraindication rule, pharmacists can hide behind sub-
standard expertise to show that they were not negligent in a
given case because they simply lacked subjective knowledge of a
contraindication. A pharmacist's ignorance then becomes a
defense to liability for negligence, making pharmacist liability an
island in tort law.3 76  The obvious error rule injects some
373. Homer v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
374. Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 123 (1982); Happel v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1120 n.1 (ll. 2002).
375. 3 PEGALIS, supra note 80, § 17:9.
376. Such a position is particularly ill-advised given that pharmacists are
professionals commanding specialized knowledge pertaining to drugs and their
properties. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290, cmt. b (1965)
Where the issue is as to the requirement of minimum knowledge
demanded by the standard of the reasonable man, as stated in this Section,
the actor is held to the same conduct as if he were in fact convinced that
the fact is true, even though he may in reality be entirely ignorant of it.
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objectivity into the pharmacist negligence analysis, but only
where the consequences are particularly serious and clear. As
limited to obvious errors and not any and all errors, pharmacists
can still avoid liability under this rule when they merely have
doubts about a prescription, even when faced with a doubt that
poses such foreseeable and substantial risks that failure to
inquire and to investigate further would be unreasonable.
The courts also err in suggesting types of corrective action
that a pharmacist can or should take when faced with an
erroneous prescription. 77 Some guidance is appropriate to the
extent that pharmacists are put on notice about what actions the
law may regard as meeting their duties under tort law, an area
notorious for its ambiguities emanating from the reasonableness
standard.3 78 However, each course of conduct brings its own
weaknesses. Refusal to fill a prescription might delay the use of
necessary medication when a condition calls for immediate
relief.379 In fact, a prisoner managed to survive a motion for
summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment claim against a
pharmacist that refused to fill an anticonvulsant prescription,
resulting in the prisoner suffering epileptic seizures.38 0
Moreover, warning the patient38 1 amounts to passing
responsibility to someone often without health care training to
determine what is best for themselves.3 82 Finally, consulting the
physician may resolve many issues, but the courts have had
difficulty contending with fact patterns in which physicians
Id., with id. § 290, cmt. f ("If the actor has special knowledge, he is required to utilize
it, but he is not required to possess such knowledge, unless he holds himself out as
possessing it or undertakes a course of conduct which a reasonable man would
recognize as requiring it.").
377. See Hendricks v. Charity Hosp. of New Orleans, 519 So. 2d 163, 165 (La. Ct.
App. 1987).
378. Cf IRA E. WILLIAMS, FIRST, Do No HARM: THE CURE FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 52 (2004) ("A legal definition for an acceptable standard of care
found in many state statutes is 'one used by a reasonably prudent practitioner.'
This is so vague as to be meaningless.").
379. Hendricks,519 So. 2d at 166 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
380. Johnson v. Hay, 931 F.2d 456, 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1991).
381. Hendricks, 519 So. 2d at 166.
382. Interviews with Chuck Becker, supra note 12.
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insist that an erroneous prescription is correct as written.38 3
Most pertinent to the evolution of pharmacist and physician
responsibilities, some of these affirmative suggestions may
themselves become outdated in a few years.
A PROPOSAL FOR A REASONABLENESS TEST GOVERNING BOTH
PHYSICIANS AND PHARMACISTS
Adopting an overall reasonableness test for physicians' and
pharmacists' tort law duties, and thus treating physician and
pharmacist negligence like most other negligence cases, would
ameliorate or altogether avoid the problems plaguing the
current state of health care practitioner malpractice. Such a rule
would provide primarily three benefits: allowing the courts to
pass judgment on how one of these practitioners should have
acted beyond policing the professions' standards, providing a
malleable fact-based standard that can keep up with and even
push developing technology going forward, and giving injured
patients a voice in the ongoing discussion about how physicians
and pharmacists should divide their pharmacological expertise
for better treatment outcomes.
To Examine Community Practices' Reasonableness
A reasonableness test first gives the courts and juries, well-
versed in the common sense ethics and experience independent
of the health care fields, a chance to probe the normative
implications of a given diagnosis or drug therapy plan.384 Some
may charge that lay jurists cannot comprehend the intricacies of
pharmacology, pathology, and biochemistry,385 arguing that tort
383. 2 WOODSIDE, supra note 20, § 13.03[21[fl[iii].
384. See generally FRANK FISCHER, CITIZENS, EXPERTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
THE POLITICS OF LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (2000) (arguing that citizens can play a
meaningful role in democracy, despite the hyper-technical nature of modem-day
social issues, by expressing normative judgments about these issues).
385. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY:
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 7 (1995).
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law should instead defer to the experts.3 6 But historical
experience has shown jurors' capabilities of handing complex
issues. 38 7 With the aid of expert witnesses, judges and juries are
fully capable of assessing a treatment plan's reasonableness.
This is not to say that medical practice should not enjoy any
weight or deference. To the contrary, courts should give health
care standards the same weight as other industry customs as a
doctrinal matter, rather than letting it control in its entirety with
no flexibility in every case but the most patently obvious
instances of negligence. As such, the probative weight as to the
overall question of reasonableness should be allowed to expand
and contract depending on the ultimate question of how
reasonable the practice is.
To Keep up with Shifting Professional Divisions of Labor
Grounding physician and pharmacist malpractice in the
unreasonableness of their decisions and orders would generally
turn on the facts of each case, allowing the scope of their
standards of care to meet the needs and capabilities present at
any given time. Generally, the current liability rules only partly
depend on the facts of each case. Instead, the courts define
practitioners', especially pharmacists', duties based on the
judges' own determinations about the general state of medical
and pharmacy practice. 388 Such factual policy bases suggest a
certain reality that perhaps was true at the time those judicial
opinions were drafted, circulated, and disseminated, but much
can change in a few years. And change has come. One major
change has come by way of a new legal duty. OBRA '90 is a
federal mandate that pharmacists are charged with following,
such that they must offer drug counseling and other services.389
More change is on the way given the continuing debate
surrounding whether pharmacists' roles should be expanded to
386. King, supra note 368, at 1249.
387. Id.
388. See discussion supra pp. 488-89.
389. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(2)(A) (2006).
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tap into their pharmacological training and expertise.390
With the state of health care management itself evolving
over time, negligence liability rules surrounding and
scrutinizing it should likewise be structured to adapt to
changing circumstances. One way to allow for legal rules to
track emerging treatment paradigms and scrutinize them along
the way is through a circumstantial fact-based test, such as the
standard of reasonable care. This way, the same policy
arguments that justified limiting pharmacist liability can be
introduced as factual arguments in a given case. Or they might
not be introduced because they are no longer notable at the
moment. At any specific point in time, no one knows whether
and how certain corners of the health professions will mold
themselves around each other. Rather than premise negligence
liability rules on a state of facts that might not arise in later cases,
those facts should play a role instead in determining whether the
standard of care was met, not whether a duty existed in the first
instance.391
To Give Injured Patients to Voice
With physician-pharmacist responsibilities reorganizing as
they have been in the last few decades, patients have a keen and
unique interest in how these practitioners structure their
relationships. To be sure, patients are the primary beneficiaries
of physicians' and pharmacists' judgment calls, as well as the
390. See discussion supra pp. 498-502.
391. This position invariably allows for fewer bright lines than does the current
law, which could in turn impose higher litigation costs on health care providers and
their insurers defending a tort suit. That said, another justification for getting
pharmacists more involved is that their input would actually reduce the overall cost
of health care. See, e.g., Reid Paul, Employers and Pharmacists Team Up to Drive Down
Healthcare Costs, DRUG TOPICs (May 12, 2008), http://drugtopics.moderrnedicine
.com/drugtopics/Pharmacy/Employers-and-pharmacists-team-up-to-drive-down-
he/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/515481. Even if medical malpractice litigation had
a substantial effect on other costs related to health care like malpractice insurance
premiums, and they arguably do not, see generally ToM BAKER, THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE MYTH (2007), the costs could be offset to some extent by further
pharmacist intervention.
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parties most acutely harmed when these professionals commit
medication errors.
One paramount goal of medical malpractice actions is
compensating injured patients within a particular case. 39 2 This is
perhaps the most visible function of tort law, a function
immediately relevant to the parties of an individual case. 39 3 But
there is also a public interest concern driving tort liability and
the private rights of action that vindicate them: "uncovering
dangerous products and practices." 394
Injured parties can promote safer drug therapy plans and
express their needs both in indirect and direct manners.
Indirectly, the mere threat of a malpractice or an informed
consent lawsuit itself acts to deter careless treatment. Moreover,
after a series of lawsuits covering a particular drug, health care
professionals and pharmaceutical manufacturers may back off
from using or making a drug entirely. Such was the fate of
Accutane, an anti-acne medication that was responsible for
various severe birth defects.3 95 Crushed under the weight of tort
suits, Accutane's manufacturer eventually pulled that drug from
the market.396 Directly, a particular malpractice claim could
provide a factual background for patients and their advocates to
uncover how various health care practitioners may have failed.
Patients' attorneys and their experts can show the presence of
safer alternative treatment plans.39 7 They can show that a
practitioners' chosen therapy scheme or other judgment calls
were not cost-justified.398 Given the eminent public concerns
regarding the efficient and safe administration of patient care,
the discussion on how this can best be accomplished should
392. VASANTHAKUMAR N. BHAT, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE
ANALYSIS 9-10 (2001).
393. THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 1, 1
(2001).
394. Id. at 2; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 54, at 25-26.
395. PDR, supra note 2, at 2832.
396. John Jesitus, Exit Accutane: Derms' Reactions Mixed As Roche Pulls Long-
Standing Remedy, DERMATOLOGY TIMES, Aug. 1, 2009, at 1.
397. The Ninth Circuit itself noted such alternatives in Hutchinson v. United
States, 915 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
398. See, e.g., id.
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include those affected most: patients.
CONCLUsIoN
Against the background of calls for greater collaboration among
health professionals and change in malpractice liability, in many
cases, physicians and pharmacists may not communicate at all
with each other. To some extent, this is ideal, as the physician
may have arrived at a medication decision on his or her own
without requiring the expertise of a pharmacist. Likewise, a
pharmacist may not have to consult a physician to verify that a
reasonable prescription is correct. When a patient takes the
medications approved by these practitioners and sees
improvement in the condition that ails him or her, there is little
concern about whether mistakes were made in the process. The
concern of tort law, after all, is not to scrutinize actions that
cause no harm.
The need to determine which health professional is
responsible for unreasonable missteps arises when adverse drug
reactions or interactions occur. However, the current state of
negligence liability rules governing pharmacy and medical
malpractice stifles the ability of all interested parties -patients,
health care providers, the courts, and the public at large-to
confront. Falling back on traditional negligence principles,
namely the standard of reasonable care, can ameliorate that
problem.
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